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Abstract 
This paper explores conceptions of sovereignty held by Canada’s Indigenous and 
Western cultures. It seeks to determine what sovereignty entails and how the Crown-
Indigenous relationship is affected by the judgments of Canada’s courts. The study makes 
no attempt to compare the relative merits of Indigenous and Western sovereignty 
conceptions. Similarly, it does not examine nor attempt to reconcile sovereignty-related 
tensions that may exist between the Crown and Indigenous peoples. 
The research is framed by a two-part question: (1) What are the defining characteristics 
of Indigenous and Western conceptions of sovereignty; and (2) what impact do the 
sovereignty-related judgments of Canada’s courts have on the Crown-Indigenous 
relationship? I investigate sovereignty from the perspectives of theoretical first 
principles, contemporary interpretations, and Canadian jurisprudence, principally 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia, a landmark case that established key legal principles 
pertaining to Indigenous title, evidentiary rules, and the powers of extinguishment.  
I conclude that the lack of political will is the principal impediment to achieving a just, 
harmonious relationship between the Crown and Canada’s Indigenous peoples, regardless 
of their respective conceptions of sovereignty. 
Keywords 
Indigenous, Aboriginal, First Nations, sovereignty, diversity, self-determination, 
constitutions, jurisprudence, Delgamuukw v British Columbia 
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Chapter 1  
1 Scope and Methodology  
The conquest of the Earth, which mostly means taking it away from 
those who have different complexions or slightly flatter noses than 
ourselves is not a pretty thing when you look into it too much. 
- Joseph Conrad, ‘Heart of Darkness’ 1925. 
1.1 Introduction 
Sovereignty lies at the heart of Indigenous aspirations to regain the dignity, identity, and 
rights appropriated by colonial powers since the 16th century.1 What, however, does 
sovereignty entail? If there are different conceptions, how do they affect the relationship 
between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian Crown? Moreover, what aspects of the 
relationship are attributable to the judgments of Canada’s courts? 
Sovereignty and Indigenous self-determination are conspicuous topics in Canada’s legal 
and political discourse: ones that have historically been addressed through rhetoric, 
analyses such as the 1996 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, or policy initiatives 
like the 1969 White Paper2 or the 2005 Kelowna Accord.3  
                                                 
1 The terms “Aboriginal”, “Indigenous”, “Indian”, “Métis’, “Inuit” and “First Nation” are found throughout 
the legislation, literature, and case reports referenced in this research. In many cases the terms are used 
interchangeably, which can be misleading and insensitive to those being referenced. This paper 
acknowledges that the term “Aboriginal” is frequently used in contemporary discourse, but the term 
“Indian” is considered derogatory by many people. For the purposes of this paper, the term “Indigenous” is 
used to refer collectively to those who self-identify as First Nations, Métis, or Inuit peoples, 
notwithstanding their cultural and historical differences. Direct quotations and citations employ the terms 
included in the primary documents. 
2 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy” 
(1969). Online: http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/. 
3 Parliament of Canada, “Strengthening Relationships and Closing the Gap Report” (2005). Online: 
http.lop.parl.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/. 
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It is popular to characterize such activities as attempts to ‘reconcile’ the historically 
troubled Crown-Indigenous relationship. However, achieving reconciliation has proven to 
be a profoundly elusive goal when one reflects on attempts to do so by governments 
dating back to Sir John A. Macdonald. Nevertheless, creating a relationship in which 
Indigenous and settler Canadians respect and accommodate the cultures of each is ranked 
among the current government’s highest priorities. Whether or not achieving that goal 
will qualify as reconciliation remains an open question. It is clear, however, that 
sovereignty issues are central to the process. 
1.2 Scope and Methodology 
The two-part research question investigated in this paper is: 1) What are the defining 
characteristics of Indigenous and Western conceptions of sovereignty; and (2) what 
impact do the sovereignty-related judgments of Canada’s courts have on the Crown-
Indigenous relationship? To answer these questions, this paper investigates sovereignty 
from the perspectives of theoretical first principles, contemporary interpretations, and the 
role of Canadian jurisprudence. Notwithstanding sovereignty’s spiritual roots, the study’s 
focus is political rather than religious. Moreover, the paper is descriptive rather than 
argumentative. I make no attempt to judge the relative merits of the sovereignty 
conceptions studied. Nor do I consider the moral or legal validity of historic assertions of 
sovereignty in the Americas by foreign governments. 
One cannot analyze a phenomenon like sovereignty without first establishing a broad 
understanding of its meaning and characteristics. Hence, Chapter-2 explores traditional 
and contemporary conceptions of sovereignty held by Indigenous and Western polities. In 
the absence of primary sources apart from jurisprudence, research into Indigenous beliefs 
relies on monographs, journal articles, and transcriptions of oral histories that can 
sometimes be inconsistent or coloured by the reporter. The significance of the Indigenous 
oral tradition is discussed in the context of its role in the intergenerational transfer of 
customs, laws, and history; and its evidentiary acceptance in Canada’s common and civil 
law courts. I conclude the discussion of traditional Indigenous sovereignty with 
commentaries by Taiaiake Alfred, Dale Turner, John Borrows, Jean Cohen, and Bruce 
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Clark, each of whom offers unique, controversial, and sometimes disputed insights into 
sovereignty’s meaning to Indigenous peoples. 
Researching Western sovereignty is facilitated by the availability of primary documents 
ranging from the just war (jus bellum) theories articulated by Augustine and Aquinas, 
through 15th to 19th century proclamations and statutes, to recent rulings by Canada’s 
courts. This study’s primary sources include the 15th century Papal bulls (Dum Diversas 
and Inter Caetera), the Peace of Westphalia, Royal Proclamation, Indian Act, and historic 
agreements including the Covenant Chain Alliance, and the Treaty of Niagara. The paper 
also explores secondary sources including monographs and peer-reviewed articles in 
which sovereignty and self-determination are central issues.  
The third chapter, entitled ‘The New World’ describes the arrival, distribution, and 
settlement of America’s original inhabitants, followed by a brief summary of Europe’s 
early exploration, exploitation, and settlement of the east coast and St Lawrence River 
valley. Of particular interest are the authorities and justifications employed by Columbus, 
Cabot, Cartier, and others who claimed sovereignty over North American territories – 
sometimes by gestures no more significant than raising a flag or planting coins in the 
sand. This material provides an understanding the different conceptions of sovereignty 
held by and between the European occupiers, and how each group interacted with the 
Indigenous peoples they encountered. The chapter highlights the efforts to address 
Crown-Indigenous relations made by selected Canadian Prime Ministers over the past 
150-year period. The observations provide a snapshot of the Crown’s history of making 
but not keeping promises concerning Indigenous peoples and their rights. 
The fourth chapter, entitled ‘Sovereignty and the Law’, has three subsections. The first 
introduces four instruments that largely define the Crown-Indigenous relationship. Each 
of these instrument is sufficiently complex to merit a research paper in its own right. 
Hence, for the purposes of this study they are summarized and presented strictly as 
background information. The second section examines sovereignty from a jurisprudential 
context. At a very general level it conflates Indigenous sovereignty with the tenets of 
natural law, and western sovereignty with those of positivism. It briefly discusses 
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customary law and the challenge faced by courts attempting to balance customary and 
statutory law in their judgments. 
 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, a landmark case involving Indigenous rights and 
sovereignty is explored to demonstrate differences in the trial, appeal, and Supreme Court 
pleadings, particularly how each court interpreted identical facts. Analyses of 
Delgamuukw by three scholars are offered to demonstrate differing interpretations of the 
Court’s findings and how they affect Indigenous acceptance of the courts as arbiters in 
Crown-Indigenous disputes. 
The fifth and final chapter consolidates the paper’s principal findings and suggests two 
areas where additional research may be valuable. My research reveals a fundamental gap 
between traditional Indigenous and Western understandings of sovereignty at the 
philosophical level. However, to the extent that contemporary Indigenous leaders employ 
sovereignty as an analogue for self-determination, the philosophical differences might 
play a relatively minor role in the overall relationship improvement project. 
It would be naïve to assume that any outcome other than granting absolute Indigenous 
autonomy, including radical title to all disputed lands, will satisfy the demands of the 
most ardent nationalists, activists, or traditional leaders. Although their voices are 
important, they should not derail good faith negotiations or impede progress towards 
improving the relationship. The same admonition applies to political leaders and Crown 
officials whose commitment is essential to moving the reconciliation process forward.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Sovereignty 
“A rose by any other name would smell as sweet” 
- William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliete (1599). 
2.1 Introduction 
Humans have a long history, one might say an obsession, with naming things. We appear 
motivated by the belief that objects, even fictitious ones, can be named, given meaning, 
and assigned to classes that describe what words represent and how they are perceived by 
different cultures.4 The naming of tangible objects is a universal practice. For example, 
subject to local translation, a cat is a cat, a tree is a tree, and so forth. However, when 
labels are assigned to concepts that lack normative definitions, the outcome can be 
problematic, as may be observed in terms like democracy, freedom, reconciliation, and 
law that can be contextual, culturally sensitive, and ideologically-anchored. Sovereignty 
is one of those complex terms. It has a historically-situated definition in Western 
jurisprudence and political discourse, i.e. supreme authority within a territory.5 However, 
in the context of authority being vested in an individual, an institution, or a body of laws, 
sovereignty per se does not appear in the Indigenous lexicon.6  
Sovereignty’s meaning is arguably more malleable than explicit or universal. For 
example, an Indigenous person might perceive one’s right to make life path choices as a 
manifestation of personal sovereignty; whereas, in international law sovereignty is 
                                                 
4 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan, 1953) at 43. Wittgenstein 
postulates that definitions are products of the culture and society in which a word is used. He uses the 
phrase “language games” to describe how we assign conventional names to words even though they may 
not describe their meanings to all observers.  
5 Daniel Philpott “A Definition of Sovereignty” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Stanford, Calif: Center for the Study of Language and Information) Online: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/. 
6 The Ojibwe Peoples Dictionary, sub verbo “sovereignty”. Online: <http://ojibwe.lib.umn.edu.>.  
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traditionally conflated with the authority of states to manage their affairs unimpeded by 
other jurisdictions.7 In that respect, sovereignty may be perceived by both Indigenous 
persons and nation states as a ‘shield’ against external influence, and a foundation upon 
which other rights are based. All interpretations are equally valid in the circumstances 
and epistemology of the claimant.  
Lassa Oppenheim is regarded by many as the father of the modern international law. He 
writes “...there exists perhaps no conception...more controversial than that of 
sovereignty...until this present day [there] has never been a meaning which was 
universally agreed upon.”8 Kent McNeil observes “sovereignty is a European 
concept...care needs to be taken in applying [it] in other parts of the world where societies 
were not necessarily organized on the nation-state model”.9  
A particularly insightful observation concerning differing conceptions of sovereignty was 
offered by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples which, in its final report 
concluded: 
Any detailed examination of sovereignty is ultimately a distraction from 
the issues our mandate requires us to address. Differences in deep political 
beliefs are best dealt with by fashioning a mutually satisfactory and 
peaceful coexistence rather than attempting to persuade the adherents of 
opposing positions that their beliefs are misguided.10 
                                                 
7 The concepts of ‘choice’ and ‘non-interference’ at personal, community, or state levels permeate 
sovereignty and are recurring themes throughout this paper. 
8 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 3rd ed by Ronald Roxburgh (London UK: Longmans, 
Green and Co, 1920) at 129. 
9 Kent McNeil, “Sovereignty on the Northern Plains: European, American and Canadian Claims” (2000) 
39 Journal of the West 10 at 11. 
 
10 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (2004) Volume 2: Restructuring the 
Relationship, Part 1, Chapter 2, Section 1.3. Online: http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/ch2_e.pdf. 
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These observations can lead one to conclude that sovereignty is a fluid concept that 
serves a particular purpose at a particular point in time. This idea is underscored in the 
context of Indigenous diversity and the consequential homogeneity assumption. 
Whether viewed on a personal or international scale, sovereignty involves fundamental 
issues of power and authority. To understand it as a cultural concept and legal doctrine it 
is appropriate to examine it from perspectives that include: (1) its Indigenous and 
Western foundations; (2) how it is situated in the context of legal theory; and (3) its 
evolution from a spiritual to a predominantly secular form. Above all, as evinced 
throughout this paper, one should understand that sovereignty is an elusive concept that is 
highly dependent on the context in which the term is used: There is no ‘best’ conception 
or definition. 
This chapter begins with an overview of Indigenous sovereignty focusing on three 
subtopics: (1) the role of oral history; (2) the assumed homogeneity problem; and (3) 
conflicting visions of property rights. It then explores Western sovereignty from its 
beginnings as a religious maxim through its transition to Westphalian sovereignty with 
particular reference to the importance of territoriality and international recognition. Of 
note is the distinction between Western sovereignty, which embodies the concept of a 
‘Sovereign’ (supreme power) and the traditional Indigenous conception in which 
sovereignty is an inherent (personal right) in which one is implicitly his or her own 
“Sovereign”. 
After exploring the historical foundations of sovereignty, the paper proffers an 
interpretation of Indigenous sovereignty as an analogue for communal self-determination. 
The development of Indigenous constitutions is examined from the perspective of their 
contribution to self-government agreements and their relationship to Canada’s 
Constitution Acts. Modern treaties are introduced as instruments that may contribute to a 
less adversarial Crown-Indigenous relationship. They are not examined in detail in the 
scope of this paper. 
The chapter then traces the evolution of Westphalian sovereignty from a doctrine of 
supreme (vertical) territorial control to the contemporary (horizontal) model in which 
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sovereignty is voluntarily shared among otherwise independent nations. The shared 
sovereignty model may provide opportunities for bringing Crown-Indigenous relations 
into greater harmony by establishing First Nations as a third order of government within 
Canada’s current constitutional framework.  
The chapter concludes with descriptions of two emerging challenges to nation-state 
sovereignty. First, promotion of cosmopolitan world government as an alternative to the 
Westphalian state centric model, and second, introduction of doctrines such as the United 
Nations’ Responsibility to Protect that permit international intervention to protect citizens 
from abuse or neglect by their governments.11 
2.2 Traditional Indigenous Sovereignty 
I don’t even like the word sovereignty...it denotes the idea that there is 
a sovereign, a king, or a head honcho, whatever. I think native peoples’ 
government was more of a consultative process where everyone was 
involved – women, men and children. 
-  Greg Johnson, Eskasoni, Nova Scotia, May 199212 
To understand traditional Indigenous sovereignty, one must first accept its conflation 
with spirituality and personal choice. In traditional Indigenous culture, there is no defined 
Sovereign in the sense of there being an individual or institution with supreme 
jurisdiction over the temporal affairs of individuals or communities. That said, belief in a 
Creator whose vision establishes the principles necessary for a ‘good life’ and defines the 
relationship between all living things and the earth, permeates Indigenous culture.13 
                                                 
11 United Nations “Responsibility to Protect Doctrine” (2005) A/RES/60/1 at paras 138 and 139. Online: 
www.un.org/en/genocidepreveintion/responsibilitytoprotect/html. 
12 Dave Courchene Jr, quoted in John Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials & Commentary 
4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2012) at 5. 
13 John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution, 1st ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) 
[Borrows, Indigenous Constitutions] at 79, 85, 91, 119 and 241. Borrows describes the creation stories of 
Anishinabek, Cree, Carrier, and Mi’kmaq traditions. Although each is unique to individual cultures, they 
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Traditional Indigenous sovereignty is interpreted by some as a personal freedom that “can 
neither be given nor taken away, nor can its basic terms be negotiated.”14 It celebrates 
one’s ability to make personal choices about their life path and the consequences arising 
therefrom in a culture of non-interference rather than being subjected to the political 
authority of sovereign rulers or legislative assemblies. John Borrows observes “[h]uman 
beings are born with the inherent freedom to discover who and what they are...this is 
perhaps the most basic definition of sovereignty”.15 Roger Jones, an Elder with Ontario’s 
Shawanaga First Nation, echoes Borrows’ assertion, adding “[s]overeignty is difficult to 
define because it is intangible, it cannot be seen or touched. It is very much inherent, an 
awesome power, a strong feeling of belief of a people”.16 Taiaiake Alfred postulates 
“Indigenous concepts of political relations (sovereignty) are rooted in notions of freedom, 
respect, and autonomy”.17 Indigenous sovereignty may therefore be broadly regarded as 
the right of individuals to control their lives and destiny in accordance with the culture, 
economy, and political institutions of their nations. Traditional Indigenous sovereignty is 
thus a permissive construct that enables rather than constrains personal freedom.  
There is some international consensus that sovereignty and self-determination begin at 
the personal level. In Australia, for example, the National Aboriginal and Islander Health 
Organization defines sovereignty as “Aboriginal people controlling all aspects of their 
lives and destiny. Sovereignty is independent action”.18 In that regard, one might also 
                                                 
share a common theme in terms of the relationships among all things, and the responsibilities of individuals 
to themselves and each other. 
14 John Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues: Cases, Materials & Commentary 4th ed. (Toronto: LexisNexis 
Canada, 2012) [Aboriginal Legal Issues] at 4.  
15 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) 1992-1996, as reported in Canada Communication 
Group, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Volume 2: Restructuring the Relationship 
at 105-6, 108-14. Quoted in Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues supra note 14at 3. 
16 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 3. 
17 Alfred, Taiaiake, From Sovereignty to Freedom. Toward an Indigenous Political Discourse (2004). 
Online: <http://www.taiaiake.com/pdf/spf.pdf> at 1. 
18 National Aboriginal and Islander Health Organization “Sovereignty” (1983). Online: 
<www.kooriweb.org/foley/news/story8.html.> Quoted in Larissa Behrendt, Achieving Social 
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draw a parallel to the libertarian school of western political thought in which adherents 
seek to maximize personal choice and accept ownership of the consequences arising from 
their decisions.  
2.2.1 Pre-contact Governance 
The cultural precepts of personal choice and responsibility should not be interpreted as 
the absence or rejection of social organization or a leadership model in early First 
Nations. To the contrary, evidence of sophisticated pre-contact governance systems is 
well-documented in the literature and acknowledged in court transcripts and judgments. 
For example, Borrows provides an overview of Anishinabek legal traditions in Canada’s 
Indigenous Constitution in which he describes how localized clans formed “loose 
confederacies” that managed resources, regulated behaviour, and settled disputes in a 
consensual rather than ‘top down’ manner.19  
The Haudenosaunee peoples of the southern Ontario, Quebec, New York and Wisconsin, 
i.e. the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca, and Tuscaroras; generally referred 
to as the Iroquois Confederacy, established complex governance and legal orders under 
the spiritually-based Great Law of Peace (Kaianerekowa)20. In its founding legend the 
Creator sends a messenger referred to as the Peacemaker, who is the progeny of a virgin 
birth, to spread the principles of “Peace, Power, and Righteousness, and to establish the 
Haudenosaunee longhouse as a metaphor for the Great Law.”21 Many Haudenosaunee 
Nation members still reject being labelled as Canadian citizens, arguing that their 
Confederacy’s treaties with the Crown established an alliance rather than a hierarchical 
                                                 
Justice: Indigenous Rights and Australia’s Future (Annandale NSW: Federation Press, 2003) at 
100. 
19 Borrows, Indigenous Constitutions, supra note 13 at 77. 
20 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 35.  
21 While drawing no conclusions, one cannot avoid the similarity between the Haudenosaunee Great Law 
Peacemaker story, and the Christian belief that God dispatched Jesus, also the progeny of a virgin birth, to 
bring peace and cooperation to the people of what is now the Middle East. See also, Taiaiake Alfred, Peace 
Power, Righteousness – An Indigenous Manifesto (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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relationship.22 As an enduring expression of their independence the Haudenosaunee have 
issued passports to reinforce their status as sovereign nations since 1923. However, the 
passports enjoy limited international recognition beyond their role as identification 
documents. 
The issue of Indigenous governance has a direct bearing on the sovereignty and court-
related questions examined in this paper. For example, in R v Sparrow23, a case involving 
alleged violation of British Columbia’s fishing regulations, Dickson CJC acknowledged 
long-established Indigenous governance traditions in his observation “...the Musqueam 
lived in the area as an organized society long before the coming of the European settlers” 
noting scholar Dr. Suttles’ assertion “the Musqueam were part of a regional social 
network...and were themselves an organized social group”.24 Both Sparrow’s appeal and 
the Province’s cross-appeal were dismissed by the Court and a new trial was ordered. 
The longstanding Iroquois governance structure was acknowledged in Mitchell v MNR25, 
a landmark case involving cross-border importation rights. At trial, McKeown J observed 
“...the Mohawks had achieved for themselves the most remarkable civil organization in 
the New World.”26 At the SCC, McLachlin CJC took judicial notice of McKeown’s 
assertion, stating “The Iroquois Confederacy is thought to have been formed around 
1450”, which history records as more than a century before Jacques Cartier explored the 
St Lawrence River valley on behalf of the French.27  
                                                 
22 Borrows, Indigenous Constitutions, supra note 13 at 27. 
23 R v Sparrow, [1990] SCJ No 49, [1990] 1 SCR 1075. 
24 Ibid at para 29. 
25 Mitchell v MNR, 2001 SCC33, [2001] 1 SCR 911 [Mitchell]. 
26 Ibid at para 112. 
27 Ibid. 
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Despite Mitchell’s Iroquoian claims of autonomy within the broad framework of 
Canadian sovereignty28 the Court relied upon the doctrine of sovereign succession 
defined in British colonial law and allowed the Minister of National Revenue’s appeal.29 
The claim that Indigenous rights exist because Indigenous peoples were self-governing, 
independent polities prior to arrival of European settlers, received support in R v Van der 
Peet which states “s. 35(1) [of the Constitution Act 1982] recognizes and affirms the 
doctrine of aboriginal rights...because...when Europeans arrived in North America, 
aboriginal peoples were already here”.30  
The Courts have not always been sympathetic to arguments concerning pre-contact 
Indigenous governance and legal orders. For example, in R v Syliboy31 an early Nova 
Scotia out-of-season hunting case, Patterson (Acting) Co Ct J, ruled “The Indians were 
never regarded as an independent power...The savages’ right of sovereignty, even of 
ownership were never recognized”.32 More recently, in Delgamuukw v British 
Columbia33 McEachern BCCJ denied the existence of an Indigenous legal and political 
system, referring to their culture as being primarily based on “commonsense subsistence 
practices”.34 With respect to the nature of the Gitksan and Wet’suweten legal order, he 
                                                 
28 Ibid at para 113. 
29 Ibid at para 173. “...the claimed aboriginal right never came into existence...” 
30 R v Van der Peet [1996] SCJ No 77, [1996] SCR 507 [Van der Peet] “..the doctrine of aboriginal Rights 
exists and is recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1), because...when Europeans arrived in North America, 
aboriginal peoples were already here” at para 30. Also, Haida Nation v British Columbia 2004 SCC 73, 
[2004] 3 SCR 511 “Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans arrived and were never 
conquered” at para 25. 
31 R v Syliboy, [1929] DLR 307. 
32 Ibid at 313. Patterson’s comments are reflective of the sentiments of the time and inconsistent with 
contemporary mores or language. 
33 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 [Delgamuukw]. 
34 Ibid at para 18. 
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described it as a “... most uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are 
frequently not followed by the Indians themselves”.35 
Hence, to the extent that sovereignty is associated with social structure and governance, 
there are mixed views among Indigenous and Western observers and within the courts 
themselves. Although the debate over the existence of pre-contact Indigenous governance 
and legal structures may appear settled superficially, the evidentiary weight it is afforded 
at trial remains uncertain. Moreover, as articulated in Sparrow and Mitchell, social 
structure is not necessarily perceived as a definitive marker of Indigenous sovereignty in 
common law. 
2.2.2 Contributing Factors 
Beyond its spiritual and personal aspects, there are three additional factors one should 
consider when examining Indigenous sovereignty. The first concerns verifiability. The 
history and tenets of Western sovereignty are well documented, whereas Indigenous 
beliefs and history are mostly unwritten, orally disseminated, and interpreted by revered 
Elders within each nation. Consequently, although there may be similarities among 
Indigenous beliefs and history, narratives such as creation stories and laws are localized 
and vary between communities.36 Oral history becomes particularly important in 
sovereignty-based litigation where evidentiary rules in the common law tradition favour 
documentation and first person testimony. 
The second factor concerns the diversity that exists among the 630 plus Canadian First 
Nations, and the challenges it presents to those involved in policy formulation or 
negotiations. I refer to this as ‘the homogeneity assumption’. Along with redressing 
                                                 
35 Ibid at para 20. 
36 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 63, 79, 85, and 92. Borrows observes that although 
Indigenous creation stories typically embody elements of nature and spirituality, they vary widely among 
nations like the Anishinabek, Carrier, Cree and Mi’kmaq. From the same source, see also “Sacred 
Relationships: The Earth and Anishinabek Spiritual Beliefs” at 241-242. 
14 
 
historic wrongs and accommodating ideological differences, I characterize diversity 
accommodation as a major impediment to improving the Crown-Indigenous relationship.  
The third and arguably most complex issue concerns land. Land, as it relates to title, 
rights, usage, and communal versus individual ownership, underpins sovereignty 
regardless of the definition one chooses to endorse. Resolving land-related issues is a 
major challenge faced by First Nations and the Crown alike. It is an issue that is arguably 
irreconcilable to ardent nationalists, be they Indigenous or settler Canadians in origin.  
Although the broad land issue is discussed briefly, its comprehensive analysis is beyond 
the scope of this paper. There is, however, a specific aspect of land ownership that is 
addressed herein, vis. the ability of Indigenous communities to manage land interests 
within their designated reserves. In that regard, this research reveals competing land 
ownership arguments within First Nations themselves. Those competing interests 
contributed to rejection of Pierre Trudeau’s 1969 offer to transfer radical title to all 
reserve land to First Nations communities to manage in accordance with their individual 
customs and traditions.37 
2.2.3 Oral Traditions 
Asserting claims to sovereignty in the context of Canadian land issues has historically 
required the presentation of arguments and materials in accordance with common law 
evidentiary rules. However, Indigenous history is less well documented than that of 
Western cultures in which the recording of historic events and cultural traditions has 
existed for centuries.38 Consequently, one wishing to investigate Indigenous perspectives 
                                                 
37 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy” 
(1969). Online: http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/. Article 6 declared the Crown’s intent to end its 
role as trustee, and to transfer radical title to all Reserve lands to the respective Band Councils. 
Under the proposed arrangement, it would be up to individual Bands to determine how title would 
be held and the conditions under which sales could be made and to whom. 
38 The Greek historian Thucydides (460-404 BCE) is widely recognized as the originator of applying strict 
standards of evidence-gathering and analysis of cause and effect without reference to intervention by the 
gods or mystic forces in the course of human events. Ancient Egyptian hieroglyphic writing systems can be 
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in courts or scholarship endeavours must often rely on transcriptions of oral histories 
shared with contemporary reporters by tribal Elders.39  
Although there was no evidence of a formal written language system in early Indigenous 
societies, its absence should not be interpreted as the inability to record significant 
events. For example, in northern Ontario, archeologist John Norder interprets rock art and 
pictographs as memorialization of significant events and important locations.40 Similarly, 
First Nations on the Pacific coast represent family history and significant events on totem 
poles and through feasting ceremonies that existed hundreds of years before first contact. 
Notwithstanding these exceptions, there is no debate that the oral tradition dominates 
Indigenous history and legal traditions.  
There is no suggestion here that Indigenous oral history is less accurate than documented 
western history, which itself is often criticised as being “written by the victors” and hence 
reflects their biases and perceptions.41 Moreover, there are ways other than reliance on 
written records to verify orally-reported events. For example, the archeological record is 
often useful in verifying past events such as the settlement patterns and territorial control 
claims of First Nations. Similarly, trap line and territorial boundary maps drawn by First 
Nation hunters and subsequently verified by professional surveyors can verify land 
claims and usage patterns over extended time.42 Moreover, information gathered by 
                                                 
traced as far back as 4000 BCE. Harappan scripts from the Indus River region have been estimated to 
originate as early as 3000 BCE, but to date, none have been successfully interpreted. 
39 See John Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide, 1st ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2010). In this innovative work, John Borrows employs the Indigenous storytelling tradition to explore 
Aboriginal and Western interpretations of law and political relationships. 
40 John Norder, “The Creation and Endurance of Memory and Place Among First Nations of Northwestern 
Ontario, Canada” (2012) 16:2 International Journal of Historical Archeology 335. 
41 This widely used aphorism has been attributed to Winston Churchill and other prominent political and 
literary figures. It suggests that historical records are subjective in the absence of independent supporting 
evidence. Among the most glaring examples of historic falsehoods is the claim that Columbus ‘discovered’ 
the Americas. 
42 Hugh Brody, Maps and Dreams – Indians and the British Columbia Frontier (Vancouver: Douglas and 
McIntyre, 2004). Chapter 10 at 146. 
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anthropologists over wide areas can reveal consistencies, which when correlated with 
archeological evidence is helpful in confirming oral accounts. 
Although some may question the reliability of oral history, its role was acknowledged by 
the SCC in Delgamuukw in which Lamer CJC dedicated twenty-nine paragraphs of the 
judgment to an analysis of Indigenous oral history as a reliable form of evidence, 
ultimately concluding: 
The aboriginal perspective on their practices, traditions and on their 
relationship with the land are given due weight by the courts...[which] in 
practical terms, requires courts to come to terms with the oral histories of 
aboriginal societies, which, for many aboriginal nations are the only 
record of their past.43  
  
 and in Van der Peet: 
The courts must not undervalue the evidence presented by aboriginal 
claimants simply because the evidence does not conform precisely with 
the evidentiary standards that would be applied in for example, a private 
law torts case.44 
There are indications that some Indigenous commentators resist or at least caution against 
documentation of their sacred beliefs, laws, and history. For example, resistance to 
committing Indigenous history to writing can be found in the words of the outspoken 
Lakota activist Russell Means who proclaims "I detest writing. The process epitomizes 
the European concept of "legitimate" thinking. It is one of the white world's ways of 
destroying the cultures of non-European peoples”.45 Means is clearly exploiting his status 
as an Indigenous activist and thought-leader to express a politicized personal opinion, i.e. 
that Western historians intentionally corrupt Indigenous history and traditions through the 
                                                 
43 Delgamuukw, supra note 33 at para 84.  
44 Van der Peet, supra note 30 at para 68. 
45 Russell Means “Marxism is as Alien to My Culture as Capitalism” (2011). Speech given to the Black 
Hills International Survival Gathering, in the Black Hills of South Dakota. Online: 
<www.filmsforaction.org/news>. 
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documentation process. John Borrows shares Mean’s concern about recording Indigenous 
history in a more civil tone, stating “when oral traditions are expressed in written form it 
is important that steps be taken to ensure their flexibility is not lost [and] to preserve 
greater context”.46 Although Means and other activists are entitled to their personal 
beliefs, they should not be interpreted as objective representations of Indigenous culture 
or widely held beliefs.47  
The importance of oral history as a vehicle for intergenerational knowledge transfer 
within and among First Nations is firmly established in Canadian law. As articulated by 
the SCC in Delgamuukw and Van der Peet, courts must adapt the common law rules, 
particularly those pertaining to hearsay evidence, and come to terms with the oral 
histories of Indigenous societies. The utility of oral evidence and a test for its acceptance 
was further confirmed in Mitchell48 in which McLachlin CJC ruled:  
Aboriginal oral histories may meet the test of usefulness if...no other 
means of obtaining the same evidence may exist...[and] the witness [is] a 
reliable source of the particular people’s history ... [Moreover] judges 
must resist facile assumptions based on Eurocentric traditions of gathering 
and passing on historical facts and traditions.49 
Thus, notwithstanding issues of reporter bias and the lack of confirmational evidence, 
courts have validated the role of Indigenous oral history in legal proceedings - 
particularly in cases that deal with issues linked to sovereignty. However, the weight 
assigned to orally-given evidence compared to traditionally-compliant common law 
evidence can be subjective and circumstantially dependent.  
                                                 
46 Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 13 at 144. 
47 John Borrows is a respected advocate for Indigenous causes, but not an outspoken, ‘activist’ in the 
manner of Russell Means, Pamela Palmater, Bruce Clark or others. 
48 Mitchell, supra note 25.  
49 Ibid at paras 31-34. 
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It is difficult to overcome the challenge of making a sovereignty argument in a judicial 
setting if the (oral) evidence in support of your assertions is afforded less weight than the 
documentation presented by the opposing side. An additional problem arises in the 
context of linguistic differences between regions and First Nation communities. In that 
regard, Edward Hedican offers the caveat that social and scientific evidence is often 
misinterpreted in legal cases due to the diversity of Indigenous languages as opposed to 
verifiable documentary representations of history and traditions.50 
2.2.4 Homogeneity 
A significant sovereignty issue arises from the cultural and geographic diversity of 
Canada’s Indigenous peoples, and the consequent challenge of accommodating their 
needs, including their conceptions of sovereignty, on an equitable basis. Avoiding the 
homogeneity assumption, i.e. accommodating diversity, is particularly important in 
policy areas such as family services, health, education, and housing, where the needs are 
often urgent but rarely common. It is no less important in matters concerning sovereignty, 
where the traditions and aspirations of First Nations across Canada can vary widely. 
Accommodating diversity is arguably among the greatest challenges faced by courts and 
Crown agencies. 
The homogeneity challenge is exacerbated by the division of responsibilities mandated 
by the Constitution Act 1867, the Indian Act, and provincial legislation, all of which 
impact communities whose needs may be different but are not harmonized among 
jurisdictions. A classic example of interjurisdictional conflict occurred in St Catherine’s 
Milling & Lumber Co v R, a landmark land title dispute between the Province of Ontario 
and the Dominion of Canada over the ownership of former ‘Indian lands’ and the rights 
to harvest timber.51 This case was ultimately settled by the Justice Committee of the 
                                                 
50 Edward Hedican, “Eurocentrism in Aboriginal Studies: A Review of Issues and Conceptual Problems” 
(2014) 34:1 The Canadian Journal of Native Studies. “Few people are aware that at the time of initial 
European colonization, there were over fifty distinct Aboriginal languages spoken in Canada” at 24. 
51 St. Catherine’s Milling & Lumber Co v R, (14 App Cas 46 (JCPC). 
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Privy Council (JCPC), interestingly, without participation by representatives of the 
Indigenous peoples whose rights were directly impinged. 
The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) ostensibly advocates for Canada’s Indigenous 
peoples, while Councils of Chiefs represent regional needs, but there is no entity that 
effectively represents the needs of the wealthy, politically-sophisticated Indigenous 
communities in Western Canada, small impoverished bands in northern Ontario, or 
isolated Inuit communities in the Arctic region. Moreover, the existence of pseudo-
national coordinating organizations like the AFN does not assure acceptance of proposed 
or negotiated programs. For example, the Harper government’s Bill C-3352, which 
proposed a $2 billion increase in Indigenous education funding, was rejected by a vocal 
minority of Indigenous representatives, including AFN Regional Chief and current 
Canadian Justice Minister Jody Raybould-Wilson, with the result that the agreement 
failed and AFN Grand Chief Shawn Atleo was forced to resign his position -- in part 
because he was perceived by some as being too close to the Conservative government to 
effectively advocate Indigenous concerns. One might argue that internal politics led to 
the initiative’s failure, but it underscores the diversity of opinion evident in the 
Indigenous milieu, and the challenge of creating nationally-scoped policies and programs. 
The problems arising from homogeneity assumptions are neither new nor unique. They 
have been extensively addressed by scholars who uniformly criticize the practice. 
Michael Coyle, for example, warns “one must be careful not to universalize the rules of 
one group as being consistently applicable to others”53 Edward Hedican asserts that 
Indigenous societies have historically been misunderstood and misclassified, leading to 
cultural stereotyping.54 He is particularly critical of the ‘distinctive culture’ tests 
                                                 
52 Canada C-33: First Nations Control of First Nations Education Act. Online: https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1358798070439/1358798420982. 
53 Michael Coyle, “Traditional Indian Justice in Ontario: A Role for the Present?” (1986) 24 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 605. Quoted by John Borrows in Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 1072. 
54 Edward Hedican, supra note 50 at 87. 
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enunciated in Van der Peet and Delgamuukw that in his opinion fail to accommodate the 
cultural differences that exist between communities. Moreover, he argues that there is no 
universal Indigenous culture and hence, “Eurocentrism…is the imaginative and 
institutional context that informs contemporary scholarship, opinion, and law…[and] 
postulates the superiority of Europeans over non-Europeans”.55  
With regard to Van der Peet and Delgamuukw, Hedican argues that Lamer CJC, “despite 
his intelligence and education…had absolutely no idea [as to] what is culture”56 even 
though the Court’s distinctiveness tests rely on criteria based on cultural traditions. He 
argues further that few non-Indigenous people, including scholars and jurists, 
acknowledge the wide range of cultural and sociological differences that exist among 
Canada’s Indigenous peoples.  
Michael Asch echoes Hedican’s criticism of the Court, asserting “the Court is in conflict 
with contemporary understandings about the nature of culture when it suggests that rights 
do not include abstract political rights, such as the right to self-determination”.57 The 
negative outcome of cultural stereotyping is frequently reflected in public policy. For 
example, the Indian Act, which effectively governs Indigenous affairs in Canada, takes an 
entirely homogeneous view of Indigenous peoples.58  
In Terms of Coexistence (2013), Sébastien Grammond asserts that Canadian law has 
adopted rules relating to Indigenous peoples which “obscure significant differences ...not 
only in terms of language, culture, and worldview, but also with respect to their current 
                                                 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid at 93. 
57 Michael Asch, “The Judicial Conceptualization of Culture After Delgamuukw and Van der Peet” (2000) 
5.2 Review of Constitutional Studies 119 at 126. 
58 Edward Hedican, supra note 50 “This concept of homogeneity is especially reinforced in the Indian Act 
in which all status Aboriginal persons are treated the same, regardless of any cultural differences that may 
distinguish one from another” at 90. 
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living condition.”59 Asch, Grammond and Hedican thus bring the problem of developing 
Indigenous-focused public policy, particularly policies relating to self-government and 
self-determination (sovereignty) into sharp relief. They argue that Crown policy makers 
and Indigenous leaders must acknowledge the extent to which their decisions impact 
members of all First Nation bands, the Inuit of northern Canada and the Métis people, 
each of which has different backgrounds, cultures, customs and understandings of 
sovereignty. Policy makers must also learn to accommodate the diversity of Indigenous 
languages which, as evident in the interpretation of terms like ‘sovereignty’, can have a 
significant effect on the understanding of the laws under which people live, and the 
transmission of cultural norms.60 
2.2.5 The Land Dilemma 
Unlike in the Western tradition, most Indigenous peoples do not normally regard land as 
a private commodity that can be divided, fenced, or sold for profit. To the contrary, land 
is perceived by many First Nations as a source of life – the “mother” that Anishinabek 
Elder Basil Johnston claims cannot be owned or sold.61 Many members of Indigenous 
communities, particularly those who practice traditional beliefs, characterize themselves 
as stewards rather than owners of land, which for them John Borrows claims “holds many 
secrets”.62  
The land dilemma has strategic and tactical dimensions which are complex and 
inextricably linked to issues of sovereignty. At the strategic level is the Crown’s claim of 
ownership and radical title to the lands reserved for First Nations, as well as surrounding 
                                                 
59 Sébastien Grammond, Terms of Coexistence: Indigenous Peoples and Canadian Law (Toronto: 
Thomson-Reuters, 2013) at 13. 
60 Ibid at 15. 
61 Dr. Basil Johnston quoted in Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 187. 
62 John Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide, 1st ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). 
“He wanted to kindle a reverence and excitement about the secrets the land still held...He was aware there 
was much we could learn from that which was hidden by the rocks, soil, grass, and trees that piled one 
upon another throughout our territory.” at 72. 
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lands in vacant or sparsely populated areas. The Court addressed, but did not fully resolve 
the issues of land title and sovereignty in Calder v AG63, Delgamuukw64, R v Marshall; R 
v Bernard65, and most recently in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia66. An indication 
of the challenges associated with resolving this issue may be observed in the Six Nations 
of the Grand River land rights dispute that has been ongoing since the early 18th century, 
with no resolution in site.67 The extremely complex land title issue is well documented in 
the literature and case reports, and as previously noted is beyond scope of this paper.  
At a more tactical level is the issue of individual versus communal interest of lands that 
have been specifically designated as reserves. Here, there is a contradiction between 
some First Nations practices and traditional beliefs concerning the communal ownership 
and sanctity of land, i.e. the right of individual members of Indigenous communities to 
control the land on which they live or conduct business. The courts affirmed the 
communal nature of land ownership in Joe v Findlay68 stating the land on which 
Indigenous people live is communal and is to be shared. 
However, under Section 20(2) of the Indian Act, members of a First Nation may be given 
land allotments for their exclusive personal use.69 An allotment, which must be approved 
by the Band Council and the Minister, conveys the right to exclusive use and occupation 
                                                 
63 Calder v AG, [1973] SCR 313. 
64 Delgamuukw, supra note 33. 
65 R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43. 
66 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia 2014 SCC 44. 
67 For a detailed description of this dispute see: “Land Rights of the Six Nations of the Grand River” 
report. Online: http://www.sixnations.ca/SNGlobalSolutionsBookletFinal.pdf. 
68 Joe v Findlay, [1987] BCJ No 20 “The statutory right to the use and benefit of reserve lands was a 
collective right in common conferred upon and accruing to the band members as a body, not individually” 
at para 379.  
69 The Indian Act, RSC 1985 C1-5 s 20. “The Minister may issue to an Indian who is lawfully in 
possession of land in a reserve a certificate, to be called a Certificate of Possession, as evidence of his right 
to possession of the land described therein.” 
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of a parcel of reserve land to individual band members. Once approved, the allotment 
holder has permanent "lawful possession" of the designated parcel of land and will be 
issued a Certificate of Possession (originally called a ‘location ticket’), as evidence of 
their rights thereto. A certificate holder may use the property for personal or commercial 
purposes, including building a home or any other structure permitted by the band’s land 
use bylaw. He or she may also lease or sell the allotment to a third party for a profit, or 
may leave the allotment to another person in his or her Will, but cannot sell, lease, or 
transfer the land to a non-member of the Reserve. The de facto ability of certificate 
holders to profit from the sale of communal land can be a source of tension within 
Indigenous communities.  
The Certificate of Possession system is similar to fee simple ownership in terms of usage 
rights, but radical title of Reserve lands remains with the Crown under terms of the Royal 
Proclamation assertion “We do further ... reserve under our Sovereignty ... all the lands 
and territories lying [within numerous defined areas] ... (and further) ... no private person 
do presume to make any purchase from the said Indians of any lands reserved for said 
Indians”. Additionally, s 37 of the Indian Act states “Land in a reserve shall not be sold 
nor title to them conveyed until they have been absolutely surrendered to Her Majesty”70  
The 1969 Government of Canada Statement on Indian Policy71 (the White Paper) 
proposed changes to the reserve land ownership doctrine, including abandonment of the 
radical title provisions of the Royal Proclamation and the Indian Act. The policy 
proposed to transfer land title and allocation authority to the individual bands that would 
subsequently be able to hold or distribute individual plots in accordance with their 
customs and beliefs. The Crown’s intent was articulated in the White Paper’s Article 6 
                                                 
70 Royal Proclamation of 7 October, 1763, RSC 1985, App II, No 1. Also the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5, 
s 37. 
71 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy” 
(1969). Online: http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/. The 1969 Government of Canada Statement on 
Indian Policy (the White Paper) proposed elimination of the distinct legal status of Indigenous peoples as a 
step to achieving equality among all Canadians.  
24 
 
which states: “the present system under which the Government must execute all leases, 
supervise and control procedures and surrenders, and generally act as trustee, must be 
brought to an end.”72 Indigenous activists, particularly Harold Cardinal speaking for the 
Chiefs of Alberta, rejected the proposal outright, declaring it “a thinly disguised 
programme of extermination through assimilation”.73 Some 150 years earlier, Shawnee 
leader Tecumseh observed: 
No tribe has the right to sell [the land], even to each other, much less to 
strangers. Sell a country! Why not sell the great sea, as well as the earth? 
Did not the Great Spirit make them all for the use of his children?74  
Land is a sacred element of traditional Indigenous culture – one linked to spirituality and 
longstanding practices such as fishing, hunting and trapping; activities that have 
supported life in Indigenous communities since time immemorial. The negative reaction 
to making reserve land available for sale is understandable in the context of community 
preservation. However, one might argue it is no more egregious than selling reserve land 
for individual or communal profit under the provisions of s 20(2) of the Indian Act. 
Nevertheless, strongly stated concerns that movement to a fee simple ownership model 
would lead to the ruination of traditional reserves by allowing ‘outsiders’ to acquire land 
within them, contributed to the White Paper being withdrawn in 1970.  
Indigenous land rights are consistently embodied in historic Crown-Indigenous treaties 
and have been tested in common law courts on several occasions.75 For example, it 
Delgamuukw, La Forest J characterizes Aboriginal title as sui generis and inconsistent 
                                                 
72 Ibid. Article-6, at para 6. 
73 Harold Cardinal, Unjust Society, revised ed (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1999). Cardinal (1945-
2005) was a Cree writer, lawyer, and activist whose seminal work Unjust Society was a response to the 
Trudeau (Sr.) 1969 White Paper. Unjust Society was instrumental in causing the Canadian government to 
abandon the policy of the 1969 White Paper. 
74 F.W. Turner III, ed, The Portable North American Indian Reader (1977) at 246. Quoted by Borrows, 
Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 181. 
75 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 180. 
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with traditional (fee simple) property law concepts.76 In Tsilhqot’in Nation, McLachlin 
CJC describes Aboriginal title as “...the right to decide how the land will be used; the 
right of enjoyment and occupancy of the land; the right to possess the land; the right to 
economic benefits of the land; and the right to pro-actively use an manage the land”77 
Despite these declarations by Canada’s highest court, as a practical matter, the nature and 
rights associated with Aboriginal title remain controversial.  
Although agreements may be reached in individual circumstances, such as Tsilhqot’in 
Nation and the Nisga’a Final Agreement (NFA)78, it seems unlikely that the underlying 
issue of land rights and title will be settled from the perspectives of Indigenous and 
Western worldviews, or their respective interpretations of sovereignty. Moreover, in the 
context of the second part of this paper’s research question, one might reasonably argue 
that the land-related judgments of Canada’s courts since 1982 have had little impact in 
terms of improving the Crown-Indigenous relationship. 
2.3 Traditional Western Sovereignty  
There are conflicting theories of Western sovereignty’s origins and the reasons for its 
ubiquity among western nations. Did it originate in 1648 or did the Peace of Westphalia 
simply give effect to its formalization as a European international relations doctrine? Is 
sovereignty a doctrine that shields nations from interference by others, or one that 
constrains the ability to protect those living under despotic regimes? Further, to what 
extent is the ongoing transition from the autonomous (internal/vertical) to shared 
(external/horizontal) sovereignty affecting the concept’s future? 
                                                 
76 Delgamuukw, supra note 33 at para 190. 
77 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, supra note 66 at para 73. 
78 Nisga’a Final Agreement Act, SBC, 1999. See also, Thomas Isaac Aboriginal Law, 5th ed (Toronto: 
Thomson-Reuters Canada, 2016) “...under the NFA approximately 2000 sq km of Crown and reserve land 
were transferred to the Nisga’a to hold in fee simple, with full ownership of the subsurface mineral title” at 
193. 
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In the 3rd and 4th centuries BCE, Plato and Aristotle referred to some sovereigns as 
philosopher-kings and magistrates. Sovereignty references can also be found in St. 
Augustine’s 4th century jus bellum narrative, and in 11th to 15th century Crusade histories 
that record the Church’s involvement in international affairs and invasion of other 
peoples’ territories.79 Under the theological and legal doctrines of the 12th to 15th century, 
non-Christians were characterized by the (Catholic) Church as being less than human. 80 
They were often considered enemies of the Faith and subjected to inquisitions, torture, 
and death in the name of God and the protection of Christianity.81 
In 1452, as the Crusades drew to a close and trade-related exploration accelerated, Pope 
Nicholas V issued Dum Diversas, a Papal bull82 that directed Portugal’s King Alfonso to 
"capture, vanquish, and subdue the pagans, and other enemies of Christ ... to put them 
into perpetual slavery ... [and] to take all their possessions and property" – a clear 
declaration of sovereignty albeit in the name of God.83 In 1493, following Columbus’ 
first voyage to the Americas, Nicolas issued a further bull entitled Inter Caetera, which 
                                                 
79 Reid, Jennifer, “The Doctrine of Discovery and Canadian Law” (2010) 30.2 Canadian Journal of Native 
Studies 335 at 336.  
80 Paul Ormerod, “The Medieval Inquisition: Scale-free networks and the suppression of heresy” (2004) 
339:3 Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 645 at 645. “From the perspective of the 
Church, heresy was seen as an infectious disease. ... Initial attempts by the inquisition to suppress heresy by 
general persecution, or even mass slaughter, of populations thought to harbour the ‘disease’ failed. ... 
Eventually, a policy of targeting key individuals was implemented, which proved to be much more 
successful.”  
81 Ibid. 
82 A Papal bull is a specific kind of public decree, letters patent, or charter issued by a pope of the 
Roman Catholic Church. It is named after the leaden seal (bulla) that was traditionally appended to the 
end in order to authenticate it. Online: www.wikipedia.org/wiki.papal-bull. 
83 Pope Nicholas V Dum Diversas (1452) "We grant you [Kings of Spain and Portugal] by these present 
documents, with our Apostolic Authority, full and free permission to invade, search out, capture, and 
subjugate the Saracens and pagans and any other unbelievers and enemies of Christ wherever they may be, 
as well as their kingdoms, duchies, counties, principalities, and other property [...] and to reduce their 
persons into perpetual slavery.” Online: <www.doctrineofdiscovery.org/dumdiversas.htm>. 
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granted Spain authority to assert sovereignty throughout the ‘new world’84 and “to 
acquire territory and trade in the lands lying west of the meridian situated one hundred 
leagues west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands.”85 The 1452 Dum Diversas and 1493 
Inter Caetera bulls were the authorities some European explorers relied upon in claiming 
sovereignty, settling non-Christian lands, and subjugating their inhabitants.86 Hence, 
Western sovereignty’s roots are inextricably linked to 15th century religious doctrine, 
particularly the Church’s attempt to spread Christianity throughout Europe and the new 
world.  
2.4 Westphalian Sovereignty 
Westphalian sovereignty, was an outcome of Church intervention in the affairs of 
Europe’s feudal states. It remains the cornerstone of western politics and international 
relations, an analogue for authority in legal and political discourse, and the mechanism 
through which control is exercised over people and space.87 Its fundamental tenets have 
not changed materially since they were operationalized by the 1648 Peace (Treaties) of 
Westphalia.88 They are currently codified in the United Nations Charter Articles 2(4) and 
                                                 
84 Inter Caetera, Papal bull, 1493. Online: www.nativeweb.org/pages/legal/indig-inter-caetera/html. 
85 Ibid. 
86 “The 15th century Papal bulls gave Christian explorers the right to claim lands they ‘discovered’ and lay 
claim to those lands for their Christian Monarchs. Any land that was not inhabited by Christians was 
available to be ‘discovered’, claimed, and exploited. If the ‘pagan’ inhabitants could be converted, they 
might be spared. If not, they could be enslaved of killed.” The English, Dutch and Germans were 
influenced but not committed to the Papal bulls as justification of their discoveries and conquests. Online: 
<www.doctrine of discovery.org>. 
87 Sovereignty’s essential characteristics have been investigated by philosophers, scholars, and political 
theorists including Aristotle (Politics), Machiavelli (The Prince), Bodin (De la République), Hobbes 
(Leviathan), and many others from ancient to modern times. Each examiner, depending on the context in 
which they were writing, offers variants, but rarely strays far from the essential relationship that exists 
between sovereignty and power.  
88 Although normally referred to as the Treaty of Westphalia there were actually several treaties signed to 
resolve the various conflicts of the European wars. For a full account of the individual treaties and the 
political order they produced, readers are referred to the Oxford Bibliographies, Online: 
<www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document>. 
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2(7), which inter alia forbid attacks on other nations and restrict intervention in their 
internal affairs.89  
The Peace of Westphalia ended more than thirty years of religious and territorial wars 
among European feudal states in which authority was diffuse and often based on personal 
loyalty rather than territory.90 The treaties arising from the Peace of Westphalia 
formalized the concept of statehood that became known as Westphalian sovereignty: a 
doctrine based on the right of states to manage their internal political affairs without 
external interference. It is noteworthy that the Westphalian non-interference principle 
was assiduously ignored by European nations during their exploitation and settlement of 
the Americas, and frequently within Europe as well.  
Although Westphalian sovereignty is best known for creating autonomous territorial 
states, its arguably greatest achievement was securing emancipation from the temporal 
control of the Church.91 Not surprisingly, considering the Church’s loss of power and 
wealth, Pope Innocent X condemned the Westphalian treaties as “null, void, damnable, 
reprobate, empty of meaning and effect, for all time”.92 Contemporary Indigenous 
activist Russell Means appears to endorse Pope Innocent’s appraisal of secular state 
governance in his 1980 declaration “We don’t want power over white institutions: We 
want white institutions to disappear”.93 
                                                 
89 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations. Online: <www.treaties.un.org/doc >.  
90 Maryann Love, “Global Problems, Global Solutions” in Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global 
Agenda (Toronto: Nelson Thomson Learning, 2003) 1 at 10. 
91 Harold Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays (New York: Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 
2014). Reference this volume for a comprehensive analysis of sovereignty’s evolution from Aristotle to 
Augustine and forward to the modern era. 
92 David Maland, Europe in the Seventeenth Century (London: Macmillan Publishing, 1966). at 16 
93 Russell Means, Marxism is as Alien to My Culture as Capitalism (1980). Online: 
<www.filmsforaction.org/news/revolution-and-american-indians-marxism-is-as-alien-to-my-
culture-as-capitalism>. 
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Under the tenets of Westphalian sovereignty, inter-state aggression is constrained by 
prohibitions against interference in another state’s domestic affairs.94 However, no viable 
mechanism to sanction those who violate the doctrine’s protocols has yet been 
established -- a condition that facilitated colonialization of the American and African 
continents and led to the demise of the post-World War I League of Nations. 
One might argue that economic sanctions mandated by the United Nations serve to 
‘punish’ states that violate international conventions or the territorial integrity of others. 
Additionally, some states’ leaders who initiate or support such violations risk being 
brought before the International Criminal Court (ICC) to account for their actions. 
However, UN sanctions and trade embargoes have a long history of impotence, as 
evidenced by their futility in dealing with North Korea, the recent Russian annexation of 
the Crimea, and their tepid effect in the Middle East.95  
In the same sense, the ICC’s processes are politicized and cumbersome to the extent that 
their threat is often ignored by those prepared to flout international conventions. For 
example, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, who currently stands accused of killing 
thousands of drug dealers and other ‘criminals’ without due process, claims “[I am] not 
afraid of the International Criminal Court” and when asked about the possibility of an 
ICC investigation “he dismissed it with a curse ... and told them to go ahead”.96  
                                                 
94 The Westphalian treaties did not bring an end to interstate conflict as evidenced by a series of wars 
among neighbouring and distant states over territory, trade routes, political ideology, and other matters, 
culminating in the 20th century World Wars I & II in which millions of military and civilian personnel were 
killed or permanently displaced.  
95 CNN “Money”. Online:<http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/25/news/north-korea-economy-
sanctions/index.html>. 
96 “Duterte Says the International Criminal Court Doesn’t Worry Him”. (June 2017) The Washington Post 
Online: <www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific//2017/06/03>. 
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Even the highly regarded United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP),97 which has almost unanimous support by the world’s nations, lacks 
an enforcement mechanism beyond the ability to cite those who fail to comply with its 
Articles. Hence, the frailty of international control mechanisms persists despite the well-
intentioned but largely ineffectual efforts of organizations like the United Nations and the 
International Criminal Court. 
A 2006 collection of essays edited by Neil Walker98 addresses the complex issue of non-
compliance, and the effect of evolving interpretations of sovereignty on 
intergovernmental relationships. From different perspectives, the contributors suggest 
that traditional interpretations of sovereignty must evolve to meet changing social and 
economic conditions in which nations operate cooperatively yet independently in a 
shared geographic environment. A fundamental requirement of effective 
intergovernmental relationships is the existence of viable enforcement processes – 
something that in large measure is missing in the current international environment.  
Notwithstanding regular violation of its principles by enterprising nations, and 
condemnation by the Church, Westphalian sovereignty inexorably expanded over the past 
three centuries to become the universal paradigm of territorial supremacy. Hendrick 
Spruyt attributes the success of Westphalian sovereignty to three principal factors: (1) the 
ability of sovereign states to extract resources and rationalize their economies without 
interference by others; (2) the efficiency with which states are able to make trading 
commitments with other states who respect their autonomy; and (3) the manner in which 
                                                 
97 United Nations, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP). Online: 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 
98 Walker, Neil, Sovereignty in Transition – Essays in European Law (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006). 
Although the articles in this volume focus on the European environment, the underlying concepts are 
equally applicable globally. 
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sovereign states segregate and delegitimize communities (nations) that are not recognized 
as sovereign states.99  
By necessity, Westphalian sovereignty will evolve to accommodate changing world 
conditions, but it is relentlessly defended by its proponents and unlikely to lose its 
dominance as a political organizing force in the foreseeable future. The following 
subsections explore three dimensions of Westphalian sovereignty relevant to this 
investigation. 
2.4.1 Sovereign Power 
In Middle Age Europe, sovereignty was typically held by hereditary rulers who possessed 
life and death power over their citizens. They demanded the unfettered right to command 
and the absolute obligation to be obeyed. By today’s standards, such rulers would be 
characterized as ‘power wielders’ rather than political leaders. Nevertheless, several 
influential 16th to 18th century scholars promoted the all-powerful sovereign concept as 
the most effective way to ensure peace, order, and good governance. For example, the 
French theorist Jean Bodin (1525-1596) argued that sovereignty was indivisible and 
absolute.100 Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), an English absolutist and founding member of 
the contractual school of political philosophy, characterized sovereigns as being above 
the law. He endorsed but did not insist upon the indivisibility assertion.101 John Austin 
                                                 
99 Hendrick Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 
quoted by Maryann Love, “Global Problems, Global Solutions” in Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global 
Agenda (Toronto: Nelson Thomson Learning, 2003) at 12. 
100 “Majesty or sovereignty is the highest, absolute, and perpetual power over the citizens and subjects in a 
Commonwealth, which the Latins call Majestas” (République, I, 84).” Bodin's discussion of tyrannicide 
[sic] is consistent with his political theory. For instance, while he states that there are instances when it is 
justified (for example against tyrannical usurpers), killing a prince presumed to be a tyrant is forbidden if 
“the prince is an absolute sovereign.” (République II, 5). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online: 
<www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/bodin/#4>. 
101 Miller, David, Political Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 
2003). “It was not essential that this sovereign body be a single person but Hobbes thought this was 
preferable” at 37. 
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(1790-1859), a British positivist, promulgated the arguments of Machiavelli, Hobbes and 
Bodin, asserting sovereignty was generally without limits and indivisible.102  
By the middle 18th century, sovereign indivisibility arguments fell out of favour as people 
endorsed rule by the aristocracy (the well-born and educated) and ultimately moved 
towards democratic forms of government which provided a modicum of political control 
to the average citizen.103 Contemporary political philosophy reasonably characterizes 
indivisible sovereignty as a manifestation of fascism as witnessed during the 20th century 
rule of Italy’s Mussolini, or more recently, Iraq’s experience under Saddam Hussein. 
Today, most absolute monarchs have been recast as ‘constitutional monarchs’ whose role 
is essentially ceremonial. For example, Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II is available to 
‘advise’ the government, but she is strictly forbidden from commenting on Britain’s 
political affairs. A few absolute monarchs, often located in the Middle East or African 
nations, remain. For example, the Sultans of Brunei and Oman, the Kings of Saudi Arabia 
and Swaziland; and arguably, the Pope who although elected by his peers has virtually 
unchecked power within the Vatican City State throughout his life. 
 With notable exceptions, such as Great Britain and New Zealand, contemporary 
sovereignty now resides in formal written constitutions that are overseen by courts, 
enacted by parliaments and administered by civil agencies.104 One might argue that there 
                                                 
102 Nicolò Machiavelli, The Prince on the Art of Power – The New Illustrated Edition, (London UK: 
Duncan Baird Publishers, 2007). Machiavelli advises his students that Princes “ought to inspire fear in such 
a way that, if he does not win love, he [at least] avoids hatred”. 
103 David Miller, Political Philosophy, supra note 101. “Trusting everything to an absolute monarch is 
simply too risky. As an alternative, placing authority in the hands of those we know to be wise and 
virtuous, and have the best interests of the people at heart” at 38, and “Democracy is not an all-or-nothing 
matter, but a continuing struggle to give people as a whole final authority over the affairs of the state” at 
48. 
104 Great Britain and New Zealand have ‘unwritten’ constitutions. Their ‘constitutional’ laws are 
embedded in Acts of Parliament or court judgments. A cardinal aspect of these unwritten constitutions is 
that in law, Parliament is sovereign in the sense of being the supreme legislative body. Since there is no 
documented constitution containing laws that are superior to ordinary Acts of Parliament, the courts may 
only interpret parliamentary statutes. Online: <www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/britains-unwritten-
constitution>. 
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has always been a degree of delegated authority within nation states and monarchies. 
However, in modern democracies, no individual possesses supreme authority in the 
manner of the ancient monarchs.105 In Canada, the Prime Minister enjoys the status of 
primus inter pares, but retention of his authority is dependent on the support of 
government ministers and caucus members. Notable examples of leaders losing power by 
attempting to exercise monarchal authority include Canadian Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher whose vulnerability to the 
goodwill of their peers was underscored when they attempted to force unpopular national 
defense and economic policies on their Cabinets, quickly leading to their political 
demise.106  
2.4.2 Territoriality 
A potentially confusing element of western sovereignty is the concept of territoriality, i.e. 
the principle by which members of a community are identified by geographic boundaries 
regardless of their cultural, political, or ethnic affiliation. However, the borders of a 
sovereign state do not necessarily circumscribe a people or a nation, as is evident in 
Canadian and American First Nations whose traditional territories and hunting patterns 
often cross modern international boundaries.107 Under the territoriality doctrine it is one’s 
location within politically-defined borders that confers membership in a state regardless 
of their history or preferences.  
                                                 
105 For example, the authority of the President of the United States (often referred to as the “world’s most 
powerful person”) is limited by a system of checks and balances based on a separation of powers doctrine 
under which the Congress and judiciary can override Presidential policies they believe exceed his 
constitutional authority or are contrary to national interests. 
106 In 1963 John Diefenbaker faced a cabinet revolt over national defense (nuclear) policy that resulted in 
the resignations of six cabinet ministers and chaos within the Conservative caucus, ultimately leading to his 
defeat in the general election and replacement as party leader. In 1990, Margaret Thatcher faced a cabinet 
revolt over economic policy that led to the resignation of key ministers and a call for a leadership 
convention, which she lost, ending her political career. 
107 For example, the first Anishinaabeg (Odawa, Ojibwe, Potawatomi, Oji-Cree, Mississaugas, and 
Algonquin) nations to encounter European settlers were those of the Three Fires Confederation, within the 
states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania in the present-day United States, and southern 
Ontario and Quebec of Canada. 
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The negative consequences of assigning people to arbitrarily-defined territories are 
underscored by Hugh Brody who in reference to British Columbia’s settlement writes 
“[t]he presence of Europeans brought shock waves [and] forced redistribution of Indian 
populations”108 Chief Thomas Bressette of the Kettle and Stony Point First Nation 
believes that territorial and cultural displacement contributed to the loss of Indigenous 
identity which he cites as a contributor to the social problems ravaging some 
contemporary First Nations.109  
The Supreme Court addressed the question of borders and territorial rights in Mitchell in 
which Mohawk Grand Chief Michael Mitchell claimed the right to travel freely between 
Canada and the United States and return with goods without having to pay cross-border 
duties. The Court rejected his claim, confirming the Government’s assertion that “such a 
right would be contrary to Canadian sovereignty”.110 In 2015, an application, also 
involving members of the Mohawk Nation, was heard by the Ontario Court of Justice in 
Her Majesty the Queen and Alicia Shenandoah and Elaine Thompson.111 The application 
sought exemption from the need to appear for examination by Canada Border Services on 
entry into Canada.  
In that incident, the applicants had been charged with not reporting to a border agent on a 
return trip from the USA. They were fined and their vehicle was seized by the border 
agent at the scene. In their application, the accused claimed that they had a 
constitutionally guaranteed right to travel freely within Mohawk territory (which 
straddles the International Boundary) without the requirement to report in person at 
                                                 
108 Hugh Brody, Maps and Dreams (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2004) at 22. 
109 Chief Thomas Bressette, Chippewas of Kettle and Stony Point First Nation. Comments made to 
University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law students in Course 9871B: Indigenous Legal Traditions, 
April 2017.  
110 Mitchell, supra note 25 at para 1. 
111 Her Majesty the Queen and Alicia Shenandoah and Elaine Thompson, 2015 ONCJ 541, [2015] OJ No 
5184. 
35 
 
Border Stations.112 The court rejected the application, ruling that the required inspection 
“represented a minimal intrusion and was consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice when balanced against societal interest in maintaining integrity of Canada’s 
borders.”113 Hence, territoriality and the right of nations to establish and maintain borders 
regardless of historical migration patterns remains a fundamental tenet of Westphalian 
sovereignty. 
2.4.3 International Recognition 
A third relevant dimension of Westphalian sovereignty concerns the importance of 
international recognition. Sovereign authority is normally exercised by independent states 
subject to voluntary arrangements negotiated to promote common interests. Within that 
construct, it is necessary that the legitimacy of a sovereign states is formally 
acknowledged by other states. In that regard, membership in the United Nations is 
helpful, but not a definitive indicator of state legitimacy. That phenomenon may be 
observed in the case of Palestine whose status as a sovereign nation remains a contentious 
issue, despite being tacitly endorsed by the United Nations.114 
Absent international recognition, emerging and unrecognized states may lack the ability 
to enter into the economic, defense, and cultural agreements that are prevalent in the 
increasingly globalized world. For example, one may recall that during the 1995 efforts 
                                                 
112 During the application hearing it was revealed that the individuals were not attempting to make a 
historic assertion of Indigenous treaty rights. The truth was that one of the parties, an American citizen, had 
‘forgotten’ her identification at home and avoiding the Border Agents was simply an attempt to enter 
Canada without the required documentation. 
113 Shenandoah and Thompson, supra note 111. The applicants’ claimed that s 18(1) of the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act (SC 2001 c 27) violated their s. 7 and s. 15 constitutional rights. Their 
application was rejected. 
114 In 2012 the State of Palestine was granted ‘non-member observer’ status in the United Nations despite 
the wishes of Canada, eight other nations, and 41 nations that abstained from voting. United Nations press 
release. Online: www.un.org/press/en/2012/ga11317.doc.htm. 
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by Quebec nationalists to gain independence from Canada115 a controversial issue was 
the extent to which an independent Quebec would receive international recognition and 
the benefits arising therefrom.116 A similar situation exists with regard to Palestinians 
who, in the absence of formal recognition of the Palestinian Authority, must often travel 
on citizenship documents issued by Jordan or Israel.117  
First Nations seeking to achieve independence (sovereignty) from Canada will face 
similar challenges. For example, the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Nation began issuing 
passports to its members as early as 1923 and continues to do so, with mixed success in 
terms of international recognition. Canada, Great Britain, the United States refuse to 
recognize the Haudenosaunee passport as a valid document for entry into their countries, 
thus requiring Haudenosaunee ‘nationals’ to travel on Canadian passports. 
The issue of national recognition became particularly critical in the aftermath of the 2001 
terrorist attacks on New York City. Since then, internationally recognized passports or 
travel visas have become the only acceptable form of documentation for those wishing to 
cross the Canada-USA border. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy acknowledges the 
increased security requirements and is working on upgrading its passports to the level 
expected by border security, but there is no assurance that the upgraded passports will be 
                                                 
115 1995 Quebec Referendum. Online: http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca /en/article/quebec-
referendum-1995/. 
116 Peter Radan, “Constitutional Law and Secession: The Case of Quebec” (1998) 2 Macarthur LR 69 
“Although recognition is not necessary to achieve statehood, the Court (SCC) recognized that, in the 
context of secession, the viability of a would-be state in the international community depends, as a practical 
matter, upon recognition by other states” at 83. 
117 The Palestinian passport, based on the 1995 Oslo Accords reached between the Israeli government and 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization, is essentially a travel document and does not stipulate that its 
owner is a citizen of Palestine. All Palestinians residing in the areas under PA rule are entitled to a 
Palestinian Authority passport. However, those Palestinians living in East Jerusalem, can only hold a 
laissez-passer, the travel document issued to them by Israel. If they wish to travel to Arab countries that 
don't recognize Israel, they must apply for a temporary Jordanian passport. Published by Jerusalem Post 
Online: <www.jpost.com/middle-east/palestinian-passports-rejected>. 
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accepted as legitimate proof of citizenship.118 The challenge of obtaining international 
recognition could be a major stumbling block for First Nations seeking independent 
sovereignty outside the Canadian confederation. Moreover, one must question the 
likelihood that independent First Nations or even regional confederacies would want or 
be able to establish the bureaucracies and mechanisms required to administer an 
internationally recognized passport control system. 
2.5 Evolving Indigenous Sovereignty  
If there is a secular conception of Indigenous sovereignty, to what extent, if at all, does it 
reflect the tenets of Western (Westphalian) sovereignty? Does a secular interpretation of 
sovereignty devalue traditional Indigenous beliefs or culture? Moreover, what, if any, 
evidence exists to support the assertion that secularity is gaining acceptance among 
Indigenous peoples?  
At the outset of this research I anticipated encountering significant differences between 
Indigenous and Western conceptions of sovereignty. Those expectations were met at the 
philosophical level, particularly in the context of the Indigenous ‘permissive’ versus the 
Western ‘restrictive’ sovereignty paradigms.119 Perhaps the most striking difference 
concerns the absence of a ‘sovereign entity’ in the Indigenous culture, as opposed to the 
Western concept of supreme territorial authority being vested in a sovereign authority 
that may be embodied in an individual, constitution, or body of laws.120  
                                                 
118 “Our passports have become a casualty of a tighter world security environment. New Haudenosaunee 
passports will meet those [security] requirements, but their recognition by other nations will continue to be 
a challenge. Fewer countries – and airlines – are recognizing them as valid travel documents.” Notice 
posted by the Haudenosaunee Documentation Committee. Online: 
<www.haudenosauneeconfederacy.com>. 
 
119 The ‘permissive’ and ‘restrictive’ characteristics of sovereignty are introduced in Section 2.1 
Traditional Indigenous Sovereignty above. 
120 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 5. Although an argument might be made that “the 
Creator” is perceived as the ultimate sovereign in Indigenous culture, there is no comparable figure in the 
temporal sense. 
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Accordingly, in the context of the first element of this paper’s research question, i.e. 
sovereignty’s defining characteristics, there are significant conceptual differences at the 
historical/philosophical level. The previous sections of this chapter might lead one to 
conclude that the gap between the conceptions is unbridgeable. However, one must ask if 
what are essentially philosophical differences have a material effect on the lived lives of 
Indigenous peoples or the Crown-Indigenous relationship writ large. 
Despite differences between traditional Indigenous and Western conceptions of 
sovereignty, the term is now used by some Indigenous leaders as a synonym for self-
determination and self-government – a right acknowledged in the Federal government’s 
1995 policy statement on implementation of Aboriginal self-government: 
The Government of Canada recognizes the inherent right of self-
government...based on the view that the Indigenous peoples of Canada 
have the right to govern themselves in matters that are internal to their 
communities, integral to their unique cultures, identities, traditions, 
languages and institutions and with respect to their special relationship to 
their land and their resources.121 
Notably, the policy statement only refers to lands situated within existing reserves, which 
falls well short of Indigenous concerns relative to other unceded lands still under dispute. 
In that regard, John Borrows’ suggests that many leaders continue to assert that 
Indigenous ‘sovereignty’ includes Indigenous ownership of disputed lands that in their 
view has never been surrendered.122 That perspective receives support in the Report from 
the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) which states in part: 
The arguments for recognizing that Aboriginal peoples are nations spring 
from the past and the present. They were nations when they forged 
military and trade alliances with European nations. They were nations 
when they signed treaties to share their lands and resources. And they are 
                                                 
121 Borrows, Indigenous Constitutions, supra note 13 at 188. Borrows quotes from The Government of 
Canada’s Approach to Implementation of the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-
Government 1995. Online: www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/pr/pub/sg/plcy_e.html.  
122 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 5-8.  
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nations today - in their coherence, their distinctiveness and their 
understanding of themselves.123 
Exercising the rights of self-government, and self-determination are core elements of the 
contemporary Indigenous quest for sovereignty. However, as Borrows explains, due to 
the diversity of Indigenous nations, one should not assume that self-government will be 
uniformly interpreted or exercised.124 To the contrary, one should assume that 
Indigenous self-government will inevitably reflect the customs and traditions of the 
nations involved, perhaps on a regional basis, but unlikely on the national scale.  
Diversity among First Nation governments should not present a challenge to Canadian 
federalism, which currently accommodates the unique characteristics of the federation’s 
13 provinces and territories. In that regard, Patrick Macklem observes that the forms of 
government most amenable to Indigenous societies can be accommodated within a 
federal structure in which Indigenous nations, like Canadian provinces, are empowered to 
make and administer the laws that affect their daily lives.125  
In 2002, in an effort to facilitate the movement towards Indigenous self-government, the 
Federal Government proposed the First Nations Governance Act (Bill C-7)126 which 
proposed revised governance structures for Canada’s Indigenous peoples. Intended to 
strengthen and ‘democratize’ Indigenous governments by giving citizens a greater voice 
in how their communities would be run, and making it easier for First Nations to respond 
                                                 
123Highlights from The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1996). Online: http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014597/1100100014637. 
124 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14. Borrows acknowledges the diversity and different 
approaches to sovereignty and self-government. “A number of treaty nations used the term ‘shared 
sovereignty’ and maintained that their treaties created a confederal relationship with the Crown, or a form 
of treaty federalism.” at 6.  
125 Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001) at 180. 
126 First Nations Governance Act, Bill C-7. Online: 
 https://lop.parl.ca/About/Parliament/LegislativeSummaries/bills_ls.asp?ls=c7&Parl=37&Ses=2. 
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to the needs of their citizens, the Bill sought to build capacity within First Nations and 
reduce the power of the Minister and Federal Government.127  
However, as with the 1969 White Paper,128 the Bill was rejected by some Indigenous 
groups as an infringement on their inherent right to self-government, vis, an attempt to 
dictate how First Nations should be governed. The Assembly of First Nations (AFN) 
denounced the Bill as “dictating how First Nations must administer the business of their 
communities...it infringes on Aboriginal rights as recognized in section 35 of Canada’s 
Constitution Act, 1982”.129  
Bill C-7 was an attempt by the Crown to improve its relationship with Canada’s 
Indigenous nations by transferring governance powers to Band Councils while increasing 
governance transparency and giving greater control to citizens. However, in addition to 
the political challenges it encountered, there were two fundamental flaws in the 
legislation: (1) it assumed that First Nations would embrace democratization as a 
governance precept; and (2) its attempt to define a uniform governance model 
perpetuated the ‘one size fits all’ homogeneity assumption. In effect, the Bill proposed to 
transform the Minister’s mandate from one of direct control under the Indian Act, to one 
of guidance and oversight.  
From the perspective of First Nations, the Bill failed to provide the sovereignty 
declaration they desired, and reinforced their subordinate position to the Crown. Based on 
their resistance Bill C-7 was not presented for Royal Assent and consequently died on the 
                                                 
127 Minister of Indian and Northern Development, First Nations Governance Act (July 2003): A Guide to 
Understanding Bill C7. “The objectives of this new legislation are to put in place provisions that reflect 
current realities, that would serve as an interim step towards self-government and put the power on reserves 
back where it belongs – in the hands of the people. (Robert Nault, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development). Online: www.fng-gpn.gc.ca/pdf/files/crarevju_e.pdf. 
128 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy” 
(1969). Online: http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/. 
129 Assembly of First Nations, The Assembly of First Nations Position on Bill C-7 The First Nations 
Governance Act. www.afn.ca/Legislation%20Info. (12 June 2003). 
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Parliamentary Order Paper. It would be reasonable to characterize the AFN response as a 
manifestation of the argument that Indigenous sovereignty is inherent - has never been 
surrendered or extinguished, and therefore cannot be mandated by the Crown.130 
To the extent that future Indigenous self-governments may exhibit commonality, one can 
predict that it may be seen first in the assertion of territorial control, i.e. freedom from 
interference in their affairs by other jurisdictions. Paradoxically, the right of self-
determination demanded by the AFN in response to Bill C-7 is also a central tenet of 
Westphalian sovereignty. From that, one might conclude that contemporary Indigenous 
sovereignty reflects a desire for self-government in a form similar to that of its early 
Westphalian counterparts.  
2.5.1 Indigenous Constitutions 
Another indicator of the desire for self-government (sovereignty) may be observed in the 
development of Indigenous constitutional instruments which, in addition to affirming 
traditional beliefs and values, outline the founding principles, laws, and the manner in 
which they will be applied within individual nations.131  
Considered broadly, constitutions are bodies of rules that establish the basic functions of 
a polity and delineate the authority of its agencies. They typically define the manner in 
which governing bodies are structured, the rules that regulate their authority, and 
importantly, the rights of citizens living within the governed territories. John Borrows 
describes constitutions as “society’s central organizing principles [that] convey 
overarching legal standards for judgment in order to elevate a political society’s future 
                                                 
130 Supra note 122. 
131 Christopher Alcantara and Greg Whitfield “Aboriginal Self-Government through Constitutional 
Design” 44.2 Journal of Canadian Studies Spring 2010.  
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development”.132 He claims further that constitutions can serve as a primary source of 
regulation, decision-making, and dispute resolution in Indigenous communities.133  
In most Western nations, constitutions are superior to ordinary legislation and immune to 
ad hoc adjustments.134 Changing national constitutions normally requires compliance 
with a process designed to discourage opportunistic political tampering.135 Hence, 
constitutions provide a measure of political stability and protection against the will of the 
government of the day, particularly in majority government circumstances. As evidenced 
in the 2007 Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement, Indigenous constitutions are 
important elements in self-government agreements.136  
Creating distinctive Indigenous constitutions may be an important step towards self-
determination and the resurgence of traditional values, but at this time there is no national 
initiative to promote or coordinate their development. Although there may be templates 
available for sharing among First Nations there is no definitive model, which may be a 
reflection of the homogeneity issue discussed above. To that point, one might ask why 
                                                 
132 Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra note 13 at 181. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Great Britain and New Zealand have ‘unwritten’ constitutions. Their ‘constitutional’ laws are 
embedded in Acts of Parliament or court judgments. A key aspect of unwritten constitutions is that 
Parliament is sovereign in the sense of being the supreme legislative body. Since there is no documented 
constitution containing laws that are superior to ordinary Acts of Parliament, the courts may only interpret 
parliamentary statutes.  
135 A detailed description of the Canadian constitutional amending formula, often referred to as the ‘7/50’ 
process, may be reviewed in the Canadian Department of Intergovernmental Affairs website: <www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/aia/index.asp?lang=eng&page=canada&doc=modif-eng.htm>. 
136Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement (2007) “Tsawwassen First Nation will have a Constitution, 
consistent with this Agreement, which will provide for a democratic Tsawwassen Government, including 
its duties, composition and membership.” Article 16, para 8. Online: https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-BC/STAGING/texte-text/tfnfa_1100100022707_eng.pdf. 
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the Assembly of First Nations, in its role as a First Nations advocate, has not established 
a policy committee to create a constitutional template for use across the country.137  
A risk associated with locally-crafted constitutions, even if they are prepared with the 
assistance of ‘experts’, is the potential for conflict with the Constitution Act 1982, 
specifically the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. For example, a constitution currently 
under development by Ontario’s Chippewa of the Thames First Nation (and possibly 
others) contains an article that declares its primacy over all other laws and constitutions, 
including the Canadian Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982.138 If the Chippewa 
constitution is passed in its current form it will be interesting to observe the proceedings 
of a possible future legal case in which an Indigenous person living on the Chippewa 
reserve seeks the protection of the Constitution Act s.2 or s.15 provisions, only to 
discover that the constitution governing their nation may not provide comparable 
rights.139 Moreover, s 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 negates the authority of any 
instrument asserting primacy in constitutional affairs – a hurdle that could only be 
overcome by a constitutional amendment, which is something Canadian governments 
have been reluctant to consider since failure of the 1992 Charlottetown Accord.140 On the 
other hand, one cannot discount the possibility that the Chippewa or other Indigenous 
                                                 
137 The Assembly of First Nations lists 25 policy areas in its mandate, none of which address Indigenous 
constitutions. See, Assembly of First Nations Policy Areas, Online: < http://www.afn.ca/en/policy-
areas/accountability>. 
138 Draft constitution under development by the Chippewa of the Thames First Nation. Quoted by John 
Borrows at the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law Indigenous Law Camp (May 23-26, 2017). 
Chippewa of the Thames Community Centre, Ontario. 
139 Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c11. Section 2 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 defines the fundamental freedoms to be enjoyed by “everyone”. These include the 
freedoms of: conscience and religion, thought, belief, and expression, peaceful assembly and association. 
Section 15 guarantees equal protection under the law without discrimination based on race, ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age, or mental or physical disability. Section 25 guarantees continuity of Aboriginal 
rights arising from the Royal Proclamation, settled and future land claims and treaties. Online: http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-15.html. 
140 Ibid. Section 52(1) states: “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that 
is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or 
effect.” 
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constitutions may provide rights and duties not included in the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. 
Brian Slattery argues that a de facto Indigenous Constitution that binds the Crown 
already exists in the three element Aboriginal law framework established in Haida Nation 
and Manitoba Métis141 - specifically, the honour of the Crown, the Royal Proclamation, 
and Aboriginal Treaties negotiated throughout the years.142 He postulates the Indigenous 
constitution “parallels the federal pact between the provinces in the Constitution Act, 
1867 [and thus] provides the Constitution of Canada with its most ancient and enduring 
roots”.143 In effect, Slattery argues that Canada’s constitutional order is best seen as the 
conflation of Imperial statutes, historic treaties, Indigenous traditions and “ancient 
relations between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples”144 Slattery’s conception provides a 
provocative insight to the interpretation of Canada’s founding instruments and 
contemporary jurisprudence based upon them. 
Indigenous constitutions are also components of modern treaties, which are important to 
the process of moving toward Indigenous self-government.145 Nuri Frame, a Toronto-
based lawyer and Osgoode Law lecturer focused on Indigenous rights, claims “modern 
treaties negotiated over the past 40 years have profoundly changed the relationship 
between First Nations and the Crown” even though a substantial divide exists between 
                                                 
141 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests) 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511. Manitoba 
Métis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General) 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 SCR 623. 
142 Brian Slattery, “The Aboriginal Constitution” (2014) from “Selected Works of Brian Slattery” Osgoode 
Hall Law School of York University. Originally published in 67 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 319 at 
319. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid at 336. 
145Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada “Comprehensive Claims” (2015). “The 30 
modern treaties [concluded as at July 2015] include four self-government agreements and 26 
comprehensive land claims, 18 of which include provisions related to self-government.” 
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Crown and Indigenous understandings of modern treaties as evidence of fully reconciled 
relationships.146 
2.5.2 Modern Treaties 
The 1999 Nisga’a Final Agreement147 is an early example of how Indigenous 
sovereignty and self-government can be implemented within the Canadian constitutional 
order. It is an example of the type of negotiated settlements encouraged in Delgamuukw, 
where Lamer CJC stressed the preference of negotiation over litigation in all matters 
concerning Indigenous rights and land title. Although the Nisga’a agreement is a step 
towards self-determination, it falls short of creating a third order of government with the 
same rights and privileges allocated to the provinces, territories and national government 
in sections 91 through 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867.148 Other agreements, such as the 
Labrador Inuit Final Agreement149, the Nunavut Final Agreement150, and the Yukon 
First Nations Umbrella Final Agreement151 reflect experience gained with Nisga’a and a 
somewhat more enlightened attitude towards self-determination by the federal and 
provincial governments. 
The Nisga’a Final Agreement is not without its critics. Although it was supported by Phil 
Fontaine, National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, it was rejected by First 
                                                 
146 Nuri Frame, “The Modern Treaties – The Yukon and Tlicho Agreements” (2015). Presentation at York 
University Osgoode Hall (November 2015). Speaker’s notes. 
147 Nisga’a Final Agreement, 2001. Online: http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031292/1100100031293. 
148 Canada Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs. “Nisga’a Final Agreement” online: 
<www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng>. 
149 Labrador Inuit Final Agreement. Online: <http://www.nunatsiavut.com/labrador-inuit-land-claims-
agreement-3/>. 
150 Nunavut Final Agreement. Online: http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/ 
1100100030601/1100100030602. 
151 Yukon First Nations Umbrella Final Agreement. Online: <https://cyfn.ca/agreements/ umbrella-
final-agreement/>. 
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Nations activists who referred to it as a “custodial agreement’ and the ‘BC Indian 
Act’.152 Formal challenges were filed against the agreement by: Nisga’a members 
claiming their leaders lacked the authority to enter into the agreement; the Gitanyow First 
Nation claiming a boundary violation; the Fisheries Survival Coalition – a persistent 
critic of Indigenous fishing rights; and the BC Liberal Party claiming the agreement was 
inconsistent with the division of powers provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867. None of 
the challenges was successful. Other critics, including Christopher Roth, have 
characterized the Nisga’a and similar agreements as “certificates of conquest” and 
“lessons in ‘how not to do it’ rather than templates”.153  
2.6 Evolving Westphalian Sovereignty 
Despite its domination as a political order in western nations, Westphalian sovereignty is 
frequently criticized by activists and political theorists seeking to create a unified world 
order based on the political concept of cosmopolitanism.154 Sovereignty’s territorial 
autonomy principle is also being tested by globalization’s economic, social, and 
environmental effects. Further, the political stability of sovereign states is being 
challenged by minority groups demanding a voice in domestic policies and 
governance.155  
Some observers argue that globalization and the influence of supranational entities like 
the United Nations are rendering Westphalian sovereignty obsolete. For example, 
Kenichi Ohmae claims “although it may still be politically correct to talk about states as 
                                                 
152 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 76. 
153 Christopher Roth, “Without Treaty: Without Conquest: Indigenous Sovereignty in Post Delgamuukw 
British Columbia” (2002) 17:2 Wicazo Sa Review 143 at 151. 
154 Harold Wilensky, American Political Economy in Global Perspective (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012).  
155 For example, consider the turmoil experienced following the 1991 breakup of the former Soviet Union, 
the Sandinista revolt in Nicaragua, the civil war conditions currently being experienced in the Ukraine, and 
threats to European solidarity following Britain’s recent decision to leave the EU. 
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important actors, it is a bald-faced economic lie”.156 In a similar frame, in his 
compilation of articles on the evolution of traditional sovereignty, Neil Walker observes 
that consolidation of governmental authority is being increasingly looked upon as the 
death knell of traditional state-centric sovereignty and sovereign rights.157  
How are proponents of Westphalian sovereignty responding to these pressures? What is 
the outlook for state-based sovereignty writ large? To what extent does Westphalian 
sovereignty’s evolution provide guidance to the Canadian Crown and First Nations 
seeking to reconcile their respective goals of national coherence and self-determination? 
These questions may be seen as aspects of Westphalian sovereignty’s evolving 
conception of authority, and the desire by some to replace nation-state sovereignty with a 
unified world government based on the political doctrine of cosmopolitanism. 
2.6.1 Scope of Authority 
At the state level, sovereignty can be either absolute or non-absolute, which on its face 
may appear to contradict the concept of territorial supremacy. In reality, however, much 
of the power once exercised by sovereign nations has been ceded voluntarily in 
international treaties such as: the EU and NATO alliances158; global conventions, 
including UNCLOS and the UDHR159; economic agreements and regulatory agencies 
such as NAFTA, the WTO, and IMF160; and, supranational legal forums including the 
ICJ and ICC.161 The possibility of formal re-examination of the state sovereignty concept 
                                                 
156 Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (New York: Free Press, 
1995), quoted in Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, at 29 note 66. 
157 Neil Walker, Essays in European Law (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006). 
158 European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
159 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
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160 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), World Trade Organization (WTO), International 
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was raised in 2001 when United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed “in the 
21st century I believe the mission of the United Nations will require us to look beyond the 
framework of sovereign states”, thus acknowledging the growing violability of sovereign 
independence.162  
A further indication of the erosion of traditional state autonomy occurred in 2005 when 
the United Nations adopted the Responsibility to Protect (RTP) doctrine that affirms: 
Protection of its people rests first and foremost with the State itself, but a 
‘residual responsibility’ exists within with the broader community of 
states, that can be ‘activated’ when a particular state is either unwilling or 
unable to protect its citizens, or becomes the perpetrator of crimes or 
atrocities within its borders.163  
The RTP explicitly grants the UN authority to intervene, even militarily, in situations 
where a state is violating the rights of its citizens, thus overriding the non-interference 
principle on which Westphalian sovereignty is anchored.164 
2.6.2 Cosmopolitanism 
Westphalian sovereignty has evolved over time in response to changing conditions such 
as economic globalization and the demands of political minorities for greater influence 
over public policy. It is inevitable that the doctrine will continue to adjust to reflect 
changing international circumstances. If, however, it is destabilized or diluted to the point 
of becoming redundant, one might ask what would replace it and what consequences may 
arise from doing so. A frequently discussed alternative to state sovereignty is the creation 
of a ‘world government’ in which global policies are developed on a consensual basis by 
                                                 
162 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, December 10, 2001. 
Published by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect. Online: <www.iciss-ciise.gc.ca/pdfs/commission-report.pdf>. 
163 United Nations, Office on Genocide Prevention. Online: <www. un.org/ en/genocideprevention/about-
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164 The conflict in Libya, where Libyan rebels sought to overthrow Colonel Muammar Al-Qadhafi, is an 
example of use of the R2P protocol including the use of military force. Online: 
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an organization such as the United Nations. Known in political science as 
‘cosmopolitanism’, such a system, in its extreme application, would replace the world’s 
approximately 200 independent nations with a unitary political authority – a concept 
regarded as ‘fantasy’ by many observers.165  
Western University’s Richard Vernon, perceives cosmopolitanism as a moral rather than 
organizational order, arguing that what happens to people anywhere in the world should 
concern everyone else. Vernon thus challenges Westphalian sovereignty’s state-centric 
paradigm’s ability to provide a just, moral environment for global citizens.166 In his 
analysis of cosmopolitanism, David Miller, identifies serious problems such as the loss of 
democracy, the rise of global tyranny, an unmanageable bureaucracy, and the formidable 
challenge of reconciling the world’s many cultures and values.167 Without specifically 
saying so, Miller equates cosmopolitism to historically discredited political philosophies 
based on the concentration of power and the suppression of individual rights. One might 
observe that Canada’s 250-year attempt to assimilate First Nations into the mainstream 
Canadian political order, or treat them as a homogeneous political entity provides a 
compelling example of the challenge of implementing cosmopolitism on a broad scale.  
2.7 Discussion 
Scholars representing the vast sovereignty and Indigenous rights literature offer 
perspectives that embrace critical theory, historical analysis, and formalism. The 
following paragraphs sample offerings from five contributors and discuss their 
approaches to reclaiming Indigenous rights and heritage. In several areas, their arguments 
are challenged to demonstrate the hurdles they would encounter in attempting to 
                                                 
165 Science fiction fans will recognize the cosmopolitan governance model in the Star Trek television and 
movie series’ portrayal of the “United Federation of Planets” – a multi-cultural assemblage of entities 
committed to universal peace and cooperation. See <www.startrek.com/database_article/united-
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166 Richard Vernon, Cosmopolitan Regard: Political Membership and Global Justice (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 2. 
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implement or gain widespread acceptance of their proposals. As noted, these selections 
are drawn from an expansive literature to demonstrate the diversity that exists within the 
academy rather than to reinforce specific conclusions concerning the nature of 
Indigenous or Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty. 
2.7.1 Jean Cohen  
Jean Cohen is the Columbia University Nell and Herbert M. Singer Professor of Political 
Thought and Contemporary Civilization. She teaches contemporary political and legal 
theory, constitutional democracy, and international political theory with particular 
interest in sovereignty and human rights.  
Cohen posits that while defending their own sovereignty, the United States and other 
western countries are covertly promoting globalized governance to justify their 
intervention into the affairs of smaller, independent nations.168 One may infer an analogy 
between Cohen’s assessment of the current global political environment and that of the 
expansionary 16th to 18th century era when Europeans sought to increase their power 
asserting sovereignty over new world cultures under the guise of the doctrine of 
discovery. Cohen claims that “[c]osmopolitan and legal theorists…are eager to abandon 
the concept of sovereignty…but their perspective is seriously flawed.”169 Sovereignty, 
she argues, “involves normative principles and symbolic meanings worth preserving”170  
Cohen’s argument reflects Indigenous assertions that successive Canadian governments 
have attempted to achieve assimilation and cultural genocide of Canada’s First Nations in 
direct violation of the tenets of Westphalian sovereignty that prohibit interference in the 
affairs of other nations. Although Cohen does not claim a direct parallel to Indigenous 
peoples, her violation assertion reflects the argument that First Nations historically 
                                                 
168 Jean Cohen, “Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law” (2004) 18:3 Ethics & 
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negotiated with the Europeans on a nation-to-nation basis and should thereby have been 
immune to interference by colonizing nations. Thus, any attempt to regulate their internal 
affairs is a direct violation of the Westphalian non-interference precept. In that regard, the 
literature is replete with examples of interference by English, French, and Canadian 
governments in the affairs of Indigenous nations, including the Indian Act which is 
arguably the most invasive statute enacted by the Canadian Crown to date. 
Although supported by historical documents and treaties, First Nations sovereignty was 
frequently rejected by pre-1982 courts, which sometimes employed overtly racialized 
language in their decisions. For example, in R v Syliboy , a Quebec out-of-season hunting 
case in which the defendant claimed a treaty-based exemption from the regulations, 
Patterson (Acting) Co Ct J, ruled “The Indians were never regarded as in independent 
power...The savages’ right of sovereignty even of ownership were never recognized.” 171 
2.7.2 Taiaiake Alfred172 
Taiaiake Alfred is a Kahnawake (Mohawk) scholar and political activist who employs 
critical theory in his analyses. Alfred implicitly equates sovereignty to self-determination. 
In essence, he seeks to reset the clock to the time before arrival of the European when 
First Nations thrived as independent, self-sufficient polities governed by the traditional 
values of equality, respect, and consensus decision-making. His passion is apparent, but 
his calls to action lack pragmatism in the 21st century environment.  
Alfred shows particular disdain for Indigenous leaders who have accepted colonialism’s 
tenets at the expense of traditional culture. He argues that assimilated leaders “model 
themselves on the most vulgar European-style power-wielders”173 and demands that they 
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abandon the ways of mainstream politicians by returning to traditional Indigenous 
governance and rejecting foreign values. Alfred adamantly rejects the concept of large, 
homogeneous governments, arguing that they fail to accommodate Indigenous values and 
are the source of most of the factionalism that exists in Native communities.174  
As a practical matter, there are numerous problems with Alfred’s propositions. To begin, 
his suggestion that there is an Indigenous leadership model that is applicable across 
Canada ignores the diversity that exists among Canada’s First Nations, i.e. the 
“homogeneity challenge”. The flaw in his argument is evident when one considers the 
highly developed confederal structure of the Iroquois nations to which he belongs. No 
other pre-contact Indigenous community or confederacy, including the well-established 
governments of the Pacific Coast First Nations, exhibited comparable complexity or 
sophistication.175 It is unrealistic for Alfred to recommend adopting an Iroquoian-style 
governance system on a national basis as he appears anxious to do. Moreover, one might 
reasonably argue that the multi-level shared power Iroquoian Confederacy was in many 
ways a reflection of the large scale Canadian federalist system he disdains and seeks to 
replace.176  
Alfred’s Indigenous renewal program is built on four pillars. First, he calls for structural 
reform of First Nations and the return to traditional decision making processes without 
interference by non-native advisors and overseers. Arbitrary restructuring of First Nation 
bands would put them into conflict with s 74 of the Indian Act which assigns leadership 
responsibility and specific authorities to an elected band council, and as ruled in Paul 
Band (Indian Reserve No 133) v R and Whitebear Band v Carpenters Provincial Council 
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176 Supra note 174. 
53 
 
(Saskatchewan), limits the ability of bands to create processes or policies beyond those 
allowed by the Act.177 
Alfred calls for the revival of native languages, particularly by community leaders when 
conducting community business. Re-establishing traditional languages is an admirable 
objective that would contribute to restoration of the Indigenous culture, perhaps 
alleviating some of the tensions created by the loss of identity and sense of nationhood 
resulting from colonialization. However, reestablishing traditional linguistic usage may 
take decades and will require modification of band attitudes and the educational 
curricula, particularly in communities that have abandoned and possibly forgotten their 
traditional languages. Efforts to restore traditional language use are currently underway in 
some Indigenous communities. For example, Ontario’s Chippewa of the Thames band 
actively promotes use of the Anishinaabe language in its civic meetings, public school 
curriculum, local signage, and community communications. However, when asked about 
implementing a similar program in the nearby Kettle and Stony Point First Nation, Chief 
Thomas Bressette was less enthusiastic, claiming that band members have shown little 
interest in such an initiative.178 Once again, diversity of beliefs among First Nations 
limits the implementation of broadly-based initiatives including language reinstatement. 
Alfred advocates economic self-sufficiency based on expansion of land bases and 
reduced dependence on government funding. Although commendable, this objective may 
prove impractical for small or remote communities that are dependent on government 
funding in the absence of opportunities for industrial or commercial enterprises. It may be 
a viable strategy for communities willing to partner with resource companies on 
                                                 
177 Paul Band (Indian Reserve No 133) v R (1983), 1983 CarswellAlta 212. The Alberta Court of Appeal 
ruled “Band Councils are created under the Indian Act and derive their authority to operate qua band 
councils exclusively from the Act...they have no other powers.” See also, Whitebear Band v Carpenters 
Provincial Council (Saskatchewan),1982 CarswellSask 153 (CA). The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal 
ruled “an Indian band council is an elected public authority dependent on Parliament for its existence, 
powers and responsibilities...to exercise municipal and government power. 
178 Kettle and Stony Point First Nation, Chief Thomas Bressette (2017). Comments made to University of 
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infrastructure and resource development projects, but doing so would reduce the 
Indigenous independence Alfred advocates.179 A case might be made for aggregation of 
small First Nations into consortia that would share resources and avoid duplication of 
services among them. For example, the Ontario government implemented a municipal 
consolidation program in the 1990s and 2000s, reducing the number of cities, towns, and 
hamlets by several hundred. In terms of funding, one might consider creation of a 
program similar to the federal-provincial equalization program in which wealthy First 
Nations could contribute to the well-being of those lacking resources or economic 
opportunities. Such a program would reduce the fiscal capability discrepancies that exist 
between First Nations and reduce dependency on Crown funding, but would likely 
encounter significant resistance and be seen as abandonment of the federal government’s 
s 91(24) responsibilities. 
Alfred can be commended for his passion and commitment to the cause of cultural 
preservation and self-determination. Although his recommendations will be difficult to 
achieve in the ‘real world’ in which the majority of Indigenous communities exist, they 
are worthy of consideration, further study and debate. 
2.7.3 Dale Turner180 
 
Dale Turner is a member of the Teme-Augama First Nation of Northern Ontario, and an 
Associate Professor at Dartmouth College. He is an activist in the tradition Alfred, 
Cohen, Sullivan, and Valverde, who employs critical theory in his analyses of 
sovereignty, and Indigenous nationhood. In this work, Turner issues a ‘call to arms’ to 
Indigenous scholars and intellectuals, asking them to express, forcibly if necessary, an 
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Indigenous voice to overcome the ongoing effects of colonialism in political and legal 
affairs.  
Turner outlines a three-point mandate for Indigenous intellectuals. Specifically, they: (1) 
must continue to resist colonialism by deconstructing its presence and expression in the 
contemporary discourse; (2) they must promote and defend the concept of ‘indigeneity’ 
as opposed to any expressions or attempts at assimilation; and (3) they must continuously 
engage the ‘state’ in legal and political discourses. He calls upon intellectual activists to 
become “word warriors... [whose] primary function is to engage the legal and political 
discourses of the state…and to make greater inroads into the Canadian legal and political 
practices while generating a more vigorous intellectual community”.181 
Turner offers compelling arguments and a well-considered program for intensification of 
the Indigenous voice, particularly that of intellectuals engaged in legal and political 
discourse. One wonders, however, if he is ‘preaching to the choir’ in his encouragement 
of intellectuals while failing to encourage non-Indigenous scholars to join his project. 
One might also wonder if his ‘call to arms’ implies that there is consistency among 
Indigenous scholars in terms of their ideas and approaches, particularly when one 
considers the diverse circumstances experienced by Indigenous communities, some of 
which are highly sophisticated, prosperous, and well-integrated into the Canadian 
economy without being assimilated, and others that are impoverished, with limited 
prospects, and poorly led.  
2.7.4 John Borrows 
John Borrows is a professor and Law Foundation Chair in Aboriginal Justice in the 
Faculty of Law at the University of Victoria. He is one of the academy’s most prolific 
and respected scholars on issues relating to Indigenous traditions and the intersection of 
common and customary law. In this 1999 article, which has been cited by more than 140 
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jurists and scholars, he addresses the core issue posed in this research, i.e. the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s interpretation of sovereignty.182  
Borrows observes that when British Columbia entered Confederation in 1871 through the 
Act (Terms) of Union183 its population was overwhelmingly Indigenous. Despite their 
large numbers and well-established communities, Indigenous peoples were neither 
invited to participate in the province’s creation nor given an opportunity to assert title to 
their traditional lands. Consequently, England’s unilateral assertion of sovereignty 
prevailed and was thus entrenched in the Terms of Union. In fact, the only reference to 
Indigenous interests in the Terms of Union is found in Clause 13 which acknowledges the 
Dominion Government’s “charge of the Indians and the trusteeship and management of 
the lands reserved for their use and benefit”.184  
In 1871 there were few formal treaties in place with the First Nations of British 
Columbia. At issue therefore, is the question of how and by what authority did British 
Columbia’s Indigenous population fall under the sovereignty of the Dominion of Canada 
as it was known at that time. A tentative answer, was offered by British Columbia 
Supreme Court Chief Justice McEachern who, in Delgamuukw, held: 
It is because they became a conquered people, not by force of arms, for 
that was not necessary, but by an invading culture and a relentless energy 
with which they would not or could not compete” and “[at the time of 
Union] all legislative jurisdiction was divided between Canada and the 
province, and there was no room for jurisdiction or sovereignty which 
would be recognized by the law or the courts.185  
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Borrows concludes that no genuine reconciliation can occur between Indigenous and 
non-native views in the absence of a revised, consensual understanding of sovereignty. 
To that point, in a 2015 review of Tsilhqot’in Nation V British Columbia, he underscores 
the contradiction created by the Supreme Court which granted a declaration of Aboriginal 
title over Tsilhqot’in land while simultaneously affirming the Provincial Crown’s 
overriding sovereignty and underlying title to the same lands.186 He asserts that the 
parties can only reconcile their differences through a jointly conducted, objective 
examination of the underlying issues, proceeding from a common understanding of key 
issues and definitions.  
2.7.5 Bruce Clark187 
Bruce Clark is a controversial writer, and activist. He was a 1969 UWO Faculty of Law 
graduate who earned a PhD in comparative law from the University of Aberdeen in 1990 
and represented Indigenous interests in more than 40 cases beginning in 1972.188 Despite 
his academic qualifications, Clark’s behaviour in trials and hearings was characterized as 
‘unconventional’ and ‘unprofessional’ resulting in numerous sanctions by the courts.  
Notwithstanding his personal and professional issues, Clark offers a unique sovereignty-
related argument for consideration. Written at the time of his PhD dissertation, Clark 
employs legal formalism to argue that historic doctrines and legal precedents nullify 
Crown assertions of sovereignty. His central premise is that Indigenous peoples had 
jurisdictional self-governance long before European contact. He argues that their 
‘sovereignty’ was acknowledged in the Royal Proclamation and hence, no colonial 
government had the jurisdictional authority to set aside that Crown-granted right. 
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 He argues that strict interpretation of the Constitution Acts, 1867 and 1982 verifies that 
Indigenous treaty rights are de jure guarantees of Indigenous sovereignty; and further, the 
Indigenous right of self-government is embedded in the Constitution Act, 1982 s. 35 and 
the Constitution Act, 1867 sections 91(24) 109, and 146.189 Moreover, Clark claims that 
Indigenous sovereignty is confirmed by Imperial legislation including the Royal 
Proclamation (1763) and British Privy Council decisions taken during the 1631 to 1931 
period, but not repealed by Britain before its authority to do so was relinquished in the 
Statute of Westminster (1931), or by the Canadian government during its drafting of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.  
Finally, he argues further that the Crown does not have legal authority to extinguish 
rights through court decisions, legislation or regulations, and that delegation of 
municipal-style powers by the Indian Act was done without legal foundation. In effect, 
Clark is making legal formalism arguments that characterize the majority of Indigenous 
court decisions and government policies as ultra vires, thus challenging the 
extinguishment of Indigenous rights and the legitimacy of British claims of sovereignty 
based on Westphalian principles and Imperial statutes.  
Clark’s assertions have received limited support in the academy. His activism has been 
discredited by the Assembly of First Nations, the Bar Association of British Columbia 
and the Law Society of Upper Canada. He was disbarred in 1999.  
2.7.6 Summary 
There are several common themes among these scholars that can also be found 
throughout the literature. They promote a return to traditional Indigenous values and 
resurgence of the pride that has suffered under centuries of colonialism. Cohen accuses 
                                                 
189 Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 139. Section 35 recognizes the rights of the Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada, including treaty rights that now exist by way of land claim agreements or may so be acquired. 
Constitution Act, 1867, UK 30 & 31 Victoria c3. Section 91(24) grants Parliament exclusive powers over 
“Indians, and Land reserved for the Indians”. Section 109 grants ownership of all lands, mines and minerals 
to the provinces subject to them being located within the provinces and any non-provincial claims upon 
them. Section 146 allows for admission of additional colonies or provinces into the (Canadian) Union. 
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European explorers of violating the Westphalian rules that protect them from each other. 
Alfred and Turner call for the resurgence of indigeneity and traditional governance 
regimes. Turner approaches the issue from an intellectual, persuasive perspective while 
Alfred is more inclined to take direct action. Borrows and Clark focus on judicial 
processes and outcomes. Borrows analyzes the Delgamuukw trials to demonstrate the 
courts’ willful ignorance of Indigenous history and traditions. Clark rejects most 
Indigenous law court decisions as ultra vires based on his formalist interpretation of 
historical documents, statutes, and proclamations. The patterns exhibited by this small 
sample of the scholarship reflect a divide between those who support direct action, and 
those whose approach is somewhat more reflective and open to reasoned discussion and 
negotiation.  
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Chapter 3  
3 The New World 
3.1 Discovery and Settlement 
3.2 First Inhabitants 
Archeological evidence and genetic sequencing confirms that America’s first inhabitants 
(Paleo-Indians) followed game herds across the Beringia ice bridge from Asia 20,000 to 
10,000 years before arrival of the first European explorers.190 Over the ensuing millennia 
they spread across the continent, eventually settling into six geographic regions in 
Canada: (1) the Woodland First Nations in the eastern part of the country: expert hunters 
and fishers who lived in communities of 100 or so individuals who were often ‘led’ by 
the band’s most successful hunter; (2) the Iroquoian First Nations, who inhabited the area 
surrounding the Great Lakes: expert farmers, fishers, and hunters who established 
substantial permanent communities and a sophisticated governance structure within the 
Iroquoian Confederacy; (3) the Plains First Nations, who lived on the grasslands of the 
Prairies: semi-nomadic small bands that followed game migration routes: (4) the Plateau 
First Nations, whose geography ranged from semi-desert conditions in the south to high 
mountains and dense forest in the north: hunters who engaged in trading relationship with 
other bands, including Plateau First Nations (5) the Pacific Coast First Nations who 
enjoyed a moderate climate and abundant food supply that allowed them to develop clan-
based communities (houses) and sophisticated hierarchical governance structures; and (6) 
the First Nations of the Mackenzie and Yukon River Basins, whose harsh environment 
consisted of forests, barren lands and swampy terrain. This grouping included isolated 
Inuit familial groups scattered across the Artic, living as subsistence hunters whose 
                                                 
190 “Sequencing DNA from the 12,600-year-old skeleton of an infant found in central Montana, scientists 
have confirmed that early Native Americans descended from ancient Asians” Online: www.the-
scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/39153/title/First-Ancient-North-American-Genome-
Sequenced. 
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principal occupation was survival. 191 There is no indication of substantial contact among 
the regions although intra-regional interactions, including disputes over territorial 
boundaries and hunting rights no doubt occurred throughout the millennia. 
Although there is no written record of the settlement or history of the original peoples, 
there is no debate that substantial Indigenous communities with well-established laws and 
customs existed throughout the pre-colonial period.192 The Court acknowledged the 
organized nature of First Nations communities in Calder, ruling “the fact is that when the 
settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as 
their forefathers had done for centuries.”193  
Canada’s First Nations enjoyed uncontested control over their territories and the 
resources that sustained them for millennia before first contact. However, this does not 
imply there were no conflicts among aboriginal communities prior to European contact. 
John Borrows notes that North America’s aboriginal communities experienced inter-
tribal disputes over hunting grounds, territorial boundaries, and political issues, just as 
occurred in Europe, and between other nations throughout history.194  
3.2.1 The Europeans 
With respect to European settlement of the Americas, archeological evidence confirms 
that Norse explorers, not Christopher Columbus, ‘discovered’ the Americas and 
                                                 
191 Extract from Aboriginal and Northern Development Canada website. Online: <www.aadnc-
aadnc.gc.ca/eng>. 
192 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 1. 
193 Calder, supra note 63 at 156. Also Mitchell, supra note 25 at para 9. “Aboriginal people have been 
living in organized distinctive societies with their own social and political structures since long before 
Europeans arrived”. 
194 Borrows, Indigenous Constitutions, supra note 13 at 10. “...indigenous peoples are just as susceptible to 
petty squabbles and large scale controversies as other societies in the world”. 
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established permanent settlements in what is now Newfoundland, in the 11th century.195 
Until the end of the 15th century the Americas were unknown to the Europeans, who were 
principally concerned with establishing sea routes to facilitate trade in spices and silks 
with Asia.  
When Columbus ‘encountered’ the Americas in 1492, he was actually searching for a 
western sea route from Europe to Asia. His arrival in the Bahamian Islands was a 
fortuitous accident. However, under the authority of the 1452 Dum Diversas Papal bull, 
Columbus, despite not knowing where he was, immediately claimed sovereignty in the 
name of the King and Queen of Castile. At that time, sovereignty was established by 
performing symbolic acts such as “the planting of a cross or flag, burying coins, or the 
reading of an official pronouncement called the ‘Requerimiento’ (requirement).”196 
Bearing in mind that the Americas were unknown and uncharted prior to Columbus’ 
arrival, a key question concerned how much territory Columbus and future explorers 
were entitled to claim by performing these symbolic acts.  
Although under the influence of the Catholic Church at the time, advisors to Britain’s 
Henry VII (1457-1509) determined that England would not be in violation of the 1493 
Papal bull if he claimed sovereignty over lands not already discovered by Portugal or 
Spain. His decision to follow their advice had the effect of instituting a race among 
European nations to expand their foothold in the Americas.197 Following Henry VIII’s 
split with the Catholic Church in 1534, his daughter, Elizabeth I (1533-1603) proclaimed 
that nations could only assert sovereignty over newly discovered lands by actual 
                                                 
195 “The first Europeans known to set foot in Newfoundland [America] were the Norse. Beginning in the 
eighth century, they burst out of their cultural homeland in Scandinavia (particularly Norway) in a series of 
expansionist waves of migration” Online: <www. heritage.nf.ca/articles/exploration/Norse>. 
196 Jennifer Reid, “The Doctrine of Discovery and Canadian Law” (2010) 30.2 The Canadian Journal of 
Native Studies 335 at 337. Also see, Borrows supra note 14 at 196. 
197 Several of the most notable exploratory voyages, including those of John Cabot and Jacques Cartier, 
were continuations of the European quest to find an eastern sea route to Asia. For a concise chronological 
summary of the early exploration of America, particularly Canada and the Northeast coast, please refer to 
<www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/exploration>. 
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occupation of a territory rather than by performing symbolic acts. Her proclamation had 
no force in international law, but provided a solution to the issue of territorial boundaries, 
i.e. a nation must demonstrate the ability to defend circumscribed geographic areas in 
order to claim sovereignty over them. Notably, Queen Elizabeth’s proclamation preceded 
by a half century the Treaties of Westphalia, which established a similar requirement. 
The voyages of John Cabot (1450-1500), particularly his 1496 expedition198, saw 
England claim ownership of much of America’s Eastern coast. Many of England’s 
claims, which ranged from Florida to New England, violated Elizabeth’s occupation 
mandate.199 France was equally anxious to discover a new route to Asia and to acquire 
sovereign territories in the Americas. In 1534, it sponsored Jacques Cartier’s voyages 
along the St. Lawrence river and establishment of settlements as far west as Hochelaga as 
modern day Montreal was known to the area’s indigenous Iroquoians.200  
3.2.2 Early Indigenous Relations 
History records that the first European settlers, who were greatly outnumbered by First 
Nations inhabitants, depended on Indigenous communities for shelter, sustenance and 
protection. Indigenous warriors were also used with great effect during the American war 
of independence and the ongoing conflicts between the English and French in Canada. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a full account of the early 
                                                 
198 Cabot’s voyage was enthusiastically endorsed by Henry VII who issued Letters Patent stating: “[I 
grant] ... free authority, faculty and power to sail to all parts, regions and coasts of the eastern, western and 
northern sea, under our banners, flags and ensigns...to find, discover and investigate whatsoever islands, 
countries, regions or provinces of heathens and infidels, in whatsoever part of the world placed, which 
before this time were unknown to all Christians”. Extract from Henry VII’s Letter Patent granted to John 
Cabot in March 1496. Online: www. bris.ac.uk/Depts/History/Maritime/Sources. 
199 Jennifer Reid, supra note 196 at 337. Notwithstanding England’s assertion that sovereignty must be 
based on occupation, the pace of discovery by Cabot along the eastern coast and Cartier along the St. 
Lawrence River led to re-instatement of the practice of claiming sovereignty through symbolic acts...most 
frequently involving the planting of national flags and/or religious crosses. 
200 “In 1534, Jacques Cartier received a royal commission from King Francis I of France to explore the 
New World in order to find a passage to China and to find precious metals in the area around 
Newfoundland. Cartier outfitted two ships and sailed from Saint-Malo on April 20, 1534.” Online: 
<www.explorationn.marinersmuseum.org/subject/Jacques-cartier>. 
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settlement of Canada and the manner in which relationships with First Nations evolved, it 
is noteworthy that the contributions made by the Indigenous peoples were critical 
elements of Canada’s settlement and political history.201  
Throughout the formative years, interaction between Indigenous groups and European 
settlers led to ‘treaties’ that ensured peace, facilitated trade, and created alliances against 
threats from outside forces. For example, the Covenant Chain Alliance (1744) established 
the general parameters that governed British-Indigenous relations; the Robinson Treaties 
(1850) established title rights over much of Northern Ontario; the Treaty of Albany 
(1664) defined the relationship between the British and Iroquois peoples in the former 
Dutch colonies of New Netherland (New York); and the Treaty of Niagara (1764) 
confirmed the nation-to-nation relationship between settlers and First Nations peoples. 
Other agreements, some more formal than others, were created during the settlement 
period. The validity and interpretation of these treaties are key elements in contemporary 
court cases involving aboriginal rights throughout Canada.202  
In 1763, without negotiation and notwithstanding formal treaties with Indigenous peoples 
and representations to protect their interests, England arbitrarily declared sovereignty 
over all the lands and peoples their officials encountered as they colonized the Canadian 
territories, as well as those in Florida and Grenada.203 Many Indigenous leaders continue 
to reject Britain’s sovereignty and dispute the grounds upon which it is based. 
                                                 
201 There are numerous sources of Canada’s early development and the interaction of settlers, traders and 
missionaries with First Nations communities. For a summary account one might reference Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) website at www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng. For a comprehensive analysis, 
particularly as it relates to the conflict between English and French settlement efforts, I recommend Conrad 
Black’s, Rise to Greatness: The History of Canada from the Vikings to the Present (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 2014). 
202 See, for example, R v Marshall, [1999] SCJ No55; Simon v R, [1985] SCJ No 67; or R v Sioui, [1990] 
SCJ No 48. 
203 The Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763 RSC 1985, App II, No 1, was issued by Britain’s King 
George III in October 1763. Although positioned to suggest protection of aboriginal rights, it can be 
reasonably interpreted as a de jure assertion of sovereignty by its inclusion of the phrase “And We do 
further declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure, for the present as foresaid, to reserve under Our 
Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion…” at para. 3, [emphasis added].  
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Consequently, more than 250 years on, sovereignty disputes occupy Canadian courts and 
exacerbate feelings of ill-will within many indigenous communities.204 Referring to the 
nature of Indigenous sovereignty at the time of contact, Elder Moses Smith, of the Nuu-
chah-nulth Nation captures the contemporary sentiments of many Indigenous and First 
Nations people in his comment: 
What we have (had) – the big thing within our system ... is Ha Houlthee, 
which is, we might say...is true sovereignty. That is absolutely the key, the 
key of why we are today now, is that we have always been. That was 
never taken away from us.205 
The most cursory examination of Canada’s judicial history confirms that the concerns of 
Indigenous peoples were often ignored outright or adjudicated in favour of the Crown 
with minimal consideration of their interests or rights.206 Moreover, case judgments such 
as Van der Peet confirm that differing conceptions of aboriginal rights between and 
within the courts may be affecting judicial outcomes.207 
3.3 Politics, Policies and Promises 
Political scientists rank the historically troubled Crown-Indigenous relationship as one of 
Canada’s greatest cleavages. Successive governments from Sir John A. Macdonald to 
                                                 
204 Thomas Isaac, Aboriginal Law: Supreme Court of Canada Decisions (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 
2016). Isaac identifies 61 “landmark” Supreme Court of Canada Indigenous cases, representing at least 121 
lower court judgments. Each of the referenced Supreme Court cases involved submissions associated with 
Section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982, which recognizes and affirms the existing rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada, and declares that the federal and provincial governments are committed to the principle 
that no changes will be made to s 91(24), s 25, or to s 35 without participation by aboriginal peoples. 
205 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 quoted at 8. 
206 In recent years there have been a number of decisions in favour of Indigenous litigants that in previous 
generations might have been less likely to succeed. See for example: Tsilqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 
supra note 66 - the most recent and significant SCC decision on the issue of aboriginal title. 
207 See: R v Van der Peet, supra note 44 [1996]. Writing for the majority Lamer CJC held that the 
appellant failed to demonstrate her rights and dismissed her appeal. In strong dissents, L’Heureaux-Dubé J 
and McLachlin J offered different interpretations of the majority’s ‘distinctive culture’ concept and the 
importance of the “…ancestral customs and laws observed by the indigenous peoples of the territory” 
McLachlin J, at para. 248. See also: This Is Not a Peace Pipe – Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 57. 
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Justin Trudeau have committed to repairing, renewing, and reconciling the relationship 
with limited success, as may be seen in the following examples, many of which were 
essentially attempts to affect assimilation. Canada’s record of following through on 
commitments to improve Crown-Indigenous relations is disappointing. To the extent that 
these initiatives addressed Indigenous rights, particularly rights associated with the 
degree to which they could exercise self-government – an essential marker of 
sovereignty, one might reasonably conclude that limited, if any, real progress has been 
achieved. 
For example, in 1885, Prime Minister Macdonald enacted the Electoral Franchise Act208, 
declaring that Indians “...should be granted the right to become enfranchised...to place 
Indians on a footing of equality with their white brethren.” Macdonald was an 
unapologetic advocate of assimilation. The Franchise Act would have the effect of 
exchanging Indigenous sovereignty for participation (assimilation) in Canadian civil 
society. Thirteen year later, the Macdonald Franchise Act was scrapped by the Laurier 
government that denounced it as “...an insult to the free white people of this country to 
place them on a level with pagan and barbarian Indians”.209 Laurier’s action was an 
example of overt racism – certainly not an attempt to support Indigenous sovereignty.  
In 1969, after six years of consultations, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, published the 
Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy.210 The 1969 White Paper, 
somewhat echoed Macdonald’s assimilation policy by recommending elimination of the 
distinct legal status of Indigenous peoples as a step to achieving equality among all 
Canadians. Although promoted as a policy designed to allow the development of 
Indigenous culture in an environment of legal, social and economic equality with other 
                                                 
208 Electoral Franchise Act 1885. Online: http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/ article/sir-john-
alexander-macdonald/. 
209 Richard Gwyn, Nation Maker: Sir John A. Macdonald: His Life, Our Times, Volume Two: 1967-1891 
(Toronto: Random House Canada, 2011) at 419-421. 
210 Canada, Statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy (1969). Online: 
https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100010189/1100100010191. 
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Canadians, it was viewed by critics as an overt attempt at total assimilation of the 
indigenous population and was withdrawn in 1970 without formal debate by Parliament. 
In July 1990, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney faced an uprising by Mohawk Warriors at 
Oka Quebec over plans to expand a golf course on disputed land. The Mohawk stance 
was an unequivocal assertion of their sovereign rights over the disputed territory. The 
incident, which lasted 78 days and resulted in the death of a Quebec police officer, 
threatened to become even more violent. Contingency plans were made for a full military 
assault that in the appraisal of Chief of the Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, 
would result in civilian and possibly military deaths. Mulroney defused the situation 
through a mediation process backed by the threat of military involvement. Speaking in 
Parliament, he pledged “to place native concerns at the top of my government’s 
agenda...to create a new relationship between aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
Canadians”211 The Oka crisis was defused, but no measurable improvement occurred in 
terms of the relationship writ large. 
In 2005, after 18 months of negotiation, Prime Minister Paul Martin announced an 
agreement between the federal, provincial, territorial governments, and five national 
Indigenous organizations designed to equalize the standard of living between Indigenous 
and non-indigenous Canadians through cooperative programming and a $5 billion 
funding boost over a five-year period. The funding would focus on health, education, 
housing, infrastructure and economic development. Despite its commitment to move 
forward with implementation, the Liberal government failed to allocate funding in the 
2006 budget, with the result that when Martin’s government was defeated later that year, 
the program effectively died on the Order Paper. Implementation of the Kelowna 
Accord212 would have been a positive step towards Indigenous sovereignty in the sense 
                                                 
211 Brian Mulroney, Memoirs 1939-1993 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2007).at 798-799. “I give 
Canadians the assurance of the Government of Canada that ever effort will be deployed to ensure that it 
will be done. 
212 Kelowna Accord. Online: <http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/kelowna-accord>. 
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that Indigenous participation in the design and delivery of the programs could be 
perceived as a step toward self-determination and self-government on a national scale. 
Stephen Harper’s Conservative government was less active on the Indigenous file that his 
predecessors. In 2008, Prime Minister Harper formally apologized for the residential 
school program stating “I stand before you, in this chamber so central to our life as a 
country, to apologize to Aboriginal peoples for Canada's role in the Indian residential 
school system”.213 Although the apology was well-received, the government did not 
follow-through on the commitments of the Kelowna Accord that were negotiated but not 
funded by the Martin government. This failure might suggest that the apology was a 
political rather than policy initiative. Following the international financial crisis of 2008, 
the government’s focus shifted to economic recovery and Indigenous affairs slipped off 
the agenda almost completely. 
During the 2015 Federal election campaign Justin Trudeau, promised to set reconciliation 
with Canada’s First Nations as a government priority, including allocating funding for the 
Kelowna Accord. Following his election, he initiated the Inquiry into Missing and 
Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG)214; promised to implement all 94 
recommendations included in the Truth and Reconciliation Report; and committed his 
government to adopting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP). At this writing, the MMIWG inquiry is in disarray with delays, 
design controversy, resignations, and a call by some for a “hard reset”.215 There has been 
no significant progress on the Truth and Reconciliation Report recommendation 
implementation, and the promise to implement UNDRIP is not moving forward except 
for a vague commitment to examine federal legislation for conflicts and resolve them 
                                                 
213 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada. Online: www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/. 
214 National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. Online: 
http://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca. 
215 CBC National News. Online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/mmiwg-commissioners-afn-
meeting-regina-1.4223304>. 
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where possible. Although limited progress has been made to date the Prime Minister 
Trudeau’s promises remain high on the government priority list.216  
Each of these Prime Ministers has promised, but failed to renew the relationship, 
eliminate inequities, and move forward in the spirit of cooperation, respect, and justice. It 
is striking that none of the initiatives achieved their goals and in some cases have 
exacerbated rather than mitigated the longstanding distrust and negativity without 
materially achieving or advancing the reclamation of Indigenous sovereignty. 
  
                                                 
216 See Canada Department of Justice Statement on the Indigenous Relationship. Online: 
>https://www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/07/government_of_ 
canadasetsaprincipledfoundationforadvancingrenewed.html>. 
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Chapter 4  
4 Sovereignty and the Law 
“Failure of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones.” 
- Thomas Kuhn, the Structure of Scientific Revolutions 1962217 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters explored sovereignty’s historical and philosophical foundations, 
concluding that the philosophical gap between traditional Indigenous and Westphalian 
understandings was wide and possibly irreconcilable. Chapter 2 introduced a 
contemporary interpretation of Indigenous sovereignty based on self-government and 
self-determination. Chapter 3 concluded with brief reflections on the attempts of several 
Prime Ministers to address the historically troubled Crown-Indigenous relationship – 
attempts that history reveals had little positive effect. 
 This chapter explores sovereignty in the context of Canadian jurisprudence, particularly 
cases adjudicated since 1982. Four legal instruments: The Royal Proclamation, the 
Constitution Act 1867, the Indian Act, and the Constitution Act 1982 are introduced to 
establish their role in framing Canadian law and imposing Eurocentric sovereignty on 
Indigenous peoples. The chapter then examines Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1997), 
a landmark case that considered Indigenous title in the context of s 35 of the Constitution 
Act 1982, defined a specific test for ‘proving’ Aboriginal title, and established definitive 
guidelines concerning oral and traditional evidence.218  
                                                 
217 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: 50th Anniversary Edition (Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 2012). Referenced by Grace Li Xiu Woo in Ghost Dancing with Colonialism 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) at 27. 
218 Delgamuukw v British Columbia supra note 33.  
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4.2 Principal Legal Instruments 
In addition to the role of precedents arising from similar cases, courts adjudicating 
Indigenous cases are guided by four principal legal instruments: the Royal Proclamation 
1763,219 the Constitution Act 1867,220 the Constitution Act 1982,221 and the Indian 
Act.222 Although not explored in detail, it is useful to introduce them here as background 
information, and to identify the elements of each that most frequently influence case 
outcomes. 
4.2.1 The Royal Proclamation, 1763 
The Royal Proclamation was issued by Britain’s King George III in October 1763 for 
three main purposes: (1) to reinforce British authority over the lands and peoples of the 
British colonies in eastern Canada, Florida, and Grenada -- particularly over the French 
occupants of the Quebec area who had ceded control over their lands in the 1763 Treaty 
of Paris; (2) to ameliorate growing discontent and militarism among Indigenous peoples 
whose land was being exploited by European settlers; and (3) to declare Crown 
sovereignty over all lands not previously granted to individuals or reserved for 
Indigenous communities, i.e. all such lands became ‘property’ of the Crown and could 
not be settled, sold to, or exploited by any private party even if agreement was reached in 
advance with the Indigenous occupants. Although positioned to suggest protection of 
Indigenous rights, it can be reasonably interpreted as a de facto assertion of sovereignty 
by inclusion of the phrase “And We do further declare it to be Our Royal Will and 
Pleasure, for the present as foresaid, to reserve under Our Sovereignty, Protection, and 
Dominion”.223  
                                                 
219 The Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763 RSC 1985, App II, No 1. 
220 The Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31, reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II No 5. 
221 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK). 
222 Indian Act, RSC 1985, c 1-5. 
223 Supra at note 147. 
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In Delgamuukw, British Columbia argued that the Royal Proclamation only applied to 
the British colonies in eastern Canada at the time of its enactment. On appeal, Lambert 
JA declined to express an opinion on the question,224 but at the Supreme Court, Lamer 
CJC, supported by L’Heureaux-Dubé J and La Forest J, wrote “Aboriginal peoples had 
the right to possess the lands reserved for them...which were applied in principle to 
aboriginal peoples across the country”225 thereby establishing a precedent that would 
defeat similar claims made in future litigation. The Royal Proclamation is arguably 
ambiguous, and subject to ‘interpretations of convenience’ by Indigenous and Crown 
representatives alike. 
4.2.2 Constitution Act, 1867 
Originally the British North America Act226 (the BNA Act), this was one of a series of 
British statutes that addressed Canada’s desire to become an autonomous political entity. 
Although the Act established Canada’s basic bicameral, federalist form of government 
and permitted Canada’s parliament to enact legislation without British intervention, de 
facto independence was not achieved until 1931 when the Statute of Westminster227 gave 
all former colonies equal status as members of the British Commonwealth. It was not 
until 1949 that the Supreme Court of Canada, originally founded in 1857, replaced 
Britain’s Justice Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) as the final court of appeal in 
the Canadian judicial system. Of most significance to this research is s 91(24) which 
allocates responsibility for “Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians” to the legislative 
jurisdiction of the federal government. 
                                                 
224 Delgamuukw supra note 33 at para 61. 
225 Ibid at para 200. 
226 British North America Act, 1867, 30-31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.). 
227 Statute of Westminster 1931 c 4 22 and 23 Geo 5. 
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4.2.3 Constitution Act, 1982 
Enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982 in April 1982 officially terminated any residual 
authority the United Kingdom had over Canada, provided the constitutional amending 
formula that was omitted from the original BNA Act, and adopted the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. The Act’s authority is established in s 52(1) which declares 
“The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
of no force or effect”.228 Section 52(2) defines the Constitution of Canada’s 
components.229 The doctrine of constitutional supremacy established in s 52(1) has the 
potential to become aa point of contention in the context of Indigenous constitutions 
which, may claim primacy for themselves.230  
With respect to Indigenous affairs, Sections 25 and 35 are the most important clauses of 
the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 25 confirms the Charter of Rights and Freedoms does 
not extinguish the rights of Indigenous peoples arising from treaties, the Royal 
Proclamation, or settled land claims. Sections 35 and 35(1) affirm the existing rights of 
the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and declare that the federal and provincial 
governments are committed to the principle that no changes will be made to s 91(24), s 
25, or to s 35 without participation by Indigenous peoples, thus giving them unique status 
as participants in the constitutional amendment process.  
In compliance with s 52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, s 35 is an element of the 
supreme law of Canada thereby creating the potential for conflicts with federal, 
provincial or territorial legislation that may violate established or asserted Aboriginal 
rights. Arguably, the s 35 rights of Indigenous Canadians and the obligations owed to 
                                                 
228 The Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 139. Section 52(1) Primacy of Constitution of Canada. 
229 Ibid. Section 52(2) “The Constitution of Canada includes (a) the Canada Act 1982 included in this Act; 
(b) the Acts and orders referred to in the schedule; and (c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in 
paragraph (a) or (b). 
230 Supra note 138. 
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them by the Crown and Canada’s legislatures fundamentally changed the legal 
framework in which Indigenous and settler cultures co-exist. For example, since 1982 the 
Supreme Court has adjudicated at least sixty-five Indigenous cases that were based on s 
35 claims. Speaking specifically to the importance of s 35 to the future of Indigenous 
relations, McLachlin CJC observed “…the way forward in Canada is thus not in conquest 
and assimilation, but in recognition and reconciliation”.231  
4.2.4 Indian Act, RSC (1985) c 1-5 
The Indian Act, 1985 regulates most aspects of First Nations governance, including 
property rights, the structure and authority of band councils, the method of council 
election, financial management procedures, and other items which indigenous 
constitutions and modern treaties may ultimately replace. The Act is a consolidation of 
earlier colonial laws and ordinances associated with the administration of Indigenous 
affairs, including management of reserve lands and finances.  
The Indian Act’s original and arguably continuing purpose is assimilation of Indigenous 
societies into mainstream Canadian culture. In one of the most reviled statements in 
Crown-Indigenous relations, in 1920, Deputy Secretary of Indian Affairs Duncan 
Campbell Scott, wrote:  
I want to get rid of the Indian problem. I do not think as a matter of fact, 
that the country ought to continuously protect a class of people who are 
able to stand alone… Our objective is to continue until there is not a single 
Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic and there 
is no Indian question, and no Indian Department, that is the whole object 
of this Bill.232  
The Indian Act, gives Indigenous communities powers similar to those allocated to 
Canadian municipalities, thus granting a limited form of self-governance, that is closely 
                                                 
231 Right Honourable Beverly McLachlin, P.C., “Aboriginal Peoples and Reconciliation” (Public address 
at the University of Canterbury, April 28, 2003), (2003) Canterbury L. Rev 240 at 241. 
232 Duncan Scott Campbell (1920) National Archives of Canada Record Group 10, Volume 6810, File 
470-2-3 at 55. Scott’s comments referenced the proposed Residential Schools Act. 
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controlled by the Federal Crown.233 A key feature of the Act concerns band leadership. 
Under s 74, members can elect a Band Council by either customary methods including 
hereditary appointment, or through democratic elections.234 Not all First Nations accept 
the ‘restrictions’ placed on their governance by s 74. For example, in 2010, the Barriere 
Lake Algonquin First Nation characterized the council election provisions as “a 
draconian, last ditch attempt to sever the community’s connection to the land, which is at 
the heart of their governance system” and launched a series of protests and letter-writing 
campaigns designed to overturn the section’s provisions.235 
Under the Act, band councils have four basic functions: (1) operation of the band 
(municipal) government; (2) acting as an agent for the Minister of Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs (INAC); (3) acting as a communication instrument between the band 
and other levels of government; and (4) acting in an advisory capacity to the Minister.236 
Despite protests against interference in band governance, as at 2007, 252 bands hold bi-
annual elections, 334 follow traditional customs in electing their leadership, and 29 self-
governing First Nations select their leaders in accordance with their constitutions.237  
Section 81 of the Act grants band councils the authority to create by-laws in much the 
same way as municipal councils, even though Canadian municipal councils are under 
provincial jurisdiction. As with the territorial restrictions on municipal councils, band by-
laws have no effect outside the reserves and do not govern the actions of band members 
                                                 
233 Borrows, Aboriginal Legal Issues, supra note 14 at 47-49. 
234 Indian Act, supra note 69, s.74 “Whenever he deems it advisable for good governance of a band, the 
Minister may declare by order that after a day to be named therein the council of the band, consisting of a 
Chief and Councillors, shall be selected by elections to be held in accordance with this Act.”. 
235 Barriere Lake Algonquin First Nation (2010). Online: <https:// ipsmo.wordpress.com/2010/07/21/say-
no-to-indian-act-section-74>. 
236 See First Nations Governance Handbook – A Resource Guide for Effective Councils (Ottawa: 
Department of Supply and Services, 2003). Also, Whitebear Band v Carpenters Provincial Council 
(Saskatchewan), [1982] 3 WWR 554 (Sask CA) at 550-561. 
237 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada General Band Report (2007/11/28). 
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living off reserve on traditional or disputed lands. In addition to their wide-ranging 
powers under the Indian Act, band councils also have a fiduciary duty to treat all 
members equally and protect their interests as individuals and band members.238 
However, s 82(2) allows the Minister to disallow any by-law enacted by a band council 
without the requirement to give reason or permit appeal. The Indian Act’s provisions are 
arguably Canada’s most extreme examples of imposed sovereignty.  
The delegation of rights similar to those of tertiary government entities is particularly 
offensive to Indigenous leaders who argue that historic agreements with the Crown were 
always made on a nation-to-nation basis – not through the paternalistic tiered 
arrangement embodied in the Act. The Indian Act is a principal irritant in Indigenous 
communities and an undeniable representation of the Crown’s exercise of sovereignty 
over Indigenous peoples, their lands and affairs. Its interpretation and application by the 
Crown and its agencies can be characterized as bureaucratic and inflexibly formalistic.  
Over the years there have been suggestions that the Indian Act should be eliminated, but 
all such attempts have been resisted by Indigenous and settler groups alike. In 1969, 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and the Minister of Indian Affairs, Jean Chretien, 
proposed ending the special legal relationship that existed between Canada and 
Indigenous peoples. A centrepiece of the policy was the proposed dismantling of the 
Indian Act in an attempt to achieve equality among all Canadians. The policy paper was 
fiercely opposed by Indigenous groups who characterized it as being contrary to the 
process of reconciliation and settlement of historic grievances. It was withdrawn by the 
government in 1970, but it sparked an unintended increase in political activity among 
                                                 
238 Samson Cree Nation v Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development) 2002 FCT 1299, 
2002 CFPI 1299. “The Band and the Band Council are under an obligation which has sometimes be 
characterized as being a fiduciary obligation towards Band members to deal with them fairly.” at para 11. 
See also, Williams Lake Indian Band v Abbey, [1992] 4 CNLR 21 (BCSC). “There can be no question that 
a duly-elected Chief as well as the members of a Band Council are fiduciaries as far as all other members 
of the Band are concerned. The Chief upon being elected, undertakes to act in the interests of all members 
of the band” at para 14. 
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Indigenous leaders, particularly young, highly-regarded Indigenous advocates such as 
Alberta’s Harold Cardinal. 
4.3 Sovereignty, Courts, and Laws 
When sovereignty is considered from a jurisprudential perspective, my research suggests 
two distinct orientations: (1) a Western ‘state’ perspective that reflects the principles of 
legal positivism expounded by Austin, Bentham, and Hart239; and (2) an Indigenous 
‘personal’ perspective that aligns with principles of natural law expressed by Finnis, 
Grotius, and Kant.240 The Indigenous literature also incorporates elements of postmodern 
and critical theory.241  
These broad classifications are necessarily generalizations because within every 
community there exists a range of political, and ideological perspectives. Hence, it would 
be folly to characterize all courts and Crown agencies as positivists, and equally incorrect 
to characterize all Indigenous people as proponents of natural law. Nevertheless, common 
law’s reliance on statutes, precedents, and formal procedures suggests a positivistic 
orientation, whereas the literature on Indigenous legal traditions frequently reflects 
connections to spirituality, moral propositions, and the role of individuals in communal 
life.242  
                                                 
239 John Austin (1790-1859), an English legal theorist and positivist who advocated separation of law and 
morals, thus breaking with traditional ‘natural law’ tenets. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), an English 
philosopher and founder of utilitarianism as a philosophical school. H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), a British 
legal philosopher and defender of positive legal theory who was influenced by Austin and Bentham. 
240 John Finnis (1940- ), an Australian legal scholar whose work focused on natural law theory, morality 
and ethics. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), a Dutch philosopher and political theorist renowned for his work in 
the areas of natural law, particularly their source and impact of personal preservation. Immanuel Kant 
(1724-1804), a German philosopher whose interests included studies in ethics, political theory and 
morality. 
241 For example, see: Mariana Valverde “The Crown in a Multicultural Age: The Changing Epistemology 
of (Post-colonial Sovereignty” (2012) 21:1 Social and Legal Studies 3. 
242 Michael Freeman ed, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, 9th ed (London, UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2014) at 77. In Chapter 2 – Natural Law “What is Natural Law”. Freeman references John Finnis, in 4 
American Journal of Jurisprudence 2:97 (1997). The concept of individuals striving for “basic good” in the 
context of a community of humans is explored by Finnis as an extension of Aquinas’ Lex naturalis 
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Underlying these generalizations is a difference that presents a potentially significant 
barrier to improving the Crown-Indigenous relationship. Traditional Indigenous 
sovereignty is perceived as an inherent, inalienable personal right, thus making its focus 
‘permissive’. 243 Western sovereignty, on the other hand, is a control mechanism – an 
international legal doctrine that is by definition ‘restrictive’. The Western conception and 
application of sovereignty is therefore anathema to traditional Indigenous beliefs. It is, 
however, the paradigm most frequently recognized by the courts in their deliberations 
and judgments. 
Characterizing traditional Indigenous sovereignty as ‘permissive’ and Westphalian 
sovereignty as ‘controlling’ does not imply that First Nations operated without 
governance structures or legal orders, or that nations operating under the Westphalian 
doctrine unduly restrict the rights of their citizens. It does, however, highlight a challenge 
faced by courts, negotiators, and policy-makers, i.e. the need to accommodate both 
perspectives in the development of public policy and settlement of disputes. The 
challenge is exacerbated by the previously discussed Indigenous homogeneity 
assumption and the lack of an authoritative voice to represent Indigenous interests.244 
Supreme Court judgments rendered during the thirty-five-year period since the 
Constitution Act, 1982 was enacted have attempted to bring meaning to s 35(1)’s intent 
which, as ruled in R v Van der Peet, seeks “reconciliation of the pre-existence of 
distinctive societies with the assertion of Crown sovereignty”245 and subsequently in 
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia “the purpose of s. 35(1) is to facilitate 
                                                 
worldview. Also see, John Borrows, Indigenous Constitutions supra note 13, “Indigenous people also find 
and develop law from observations of the physical world around them.” at 28. 
243 Supra note 14. See previously offered explanation of my claim that traditional Indigenous sovereignty 
is ‘permissive’ whereas the Westphalian conception is more ‘restrictive’ in nature. 
244 Supra note 53. Coyle warns against universalizing the rules of one group as being applicable to others. 
Also supra note 54. Hedican comments on the effect of cultural stereotyping on Indigenous societies. 
245 R v Van der Peet, supra note 30 at para 49. At para 50, the Court underscores the importance of 
accommodating the Aboriginal perspective in efforts to achieve reconciliation. 
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the ultimate reconciliation of prior occupation with de facto Crown sovereignty.”246 
Their efforts have not always been successful. 
Accommodating differing conceptions of reconciliation, the law and sovereignty, is a 
challenge for courts, which must strike a balance that accommodates both customary and 
statutory law in their judgments. They must decide, for example, when customary norms 
qualify as ‘laws’ that can be administered by the courts and civil agencies on a consistent 
basis. Moreover, they must determine if a ‘law’ must codified and “clothed with legal 
sanction”247 to be acknowledged as enforceable. And critically, they must ask if the 
legitimacy of a legal system depends on the endorsement of a sovereign authority and the 
tenets of legal positivism?248  
Borrows defines customary law as “practices developed through repetitive patterns of 
social interaction...that are accepted as binding on those who participate in them.”249 
Although not suggesting that Indigenous legal orders rely exclusively on customary law, 
he asserts that customary law “can be very effective in producing strong and healthy 
community relationships”.250 Jeremy Webber, building on the work of Lon Fuller, posits 
that all law is grounded in societal practices and “even statutes are conceived as ‘punctual 
interventions’ comprehensible only against a background of customary norms”.251 Such 
                                                 
246 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 SCR 550 at 
para 42. 
247 John Borrows, Indigenous Constitutions supra note 30 at page 12, note 47. Borrows quotes John 
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832, reprinted 1995). 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid at 51. See also, Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th ed, (St Paul Mn: West, 2011) sub verbo “customary 
law” at 194. 
250 Ibid at 52. Borrows characterizes customary law as one source of Indigenous legal traditions, along 
with sacred law, natural law, deliberative law, and positivistic law – essentially the same components that 
to varying degrees comprise (contribute to) the tenets of the common (Imperial and Colonial) and civil 
code law in Western legal orders. 
251 Jeremy Webber, “The Grammar of Customary Law” (2009) 54 McGill LJ at 579. Webber quotes Lon 
Fuller “Human Interaction and the Law” (1969) 14 Am J Juris 1. 
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assertions are troubling to legal positivists who rely upon codified statutes, and formalists 
who prefer narrowly-construed interpretations of statutes and regulations.  
4.4 Relevant Cases 
In Ghost Dancing with Colonialism, Grace Woo identifies sixty-five Indigenous cases 
adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) between 1982 and 2006. Each of the 
cases involves s 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.252 Several of the cases are the most 
frequently referenced adjudications concerning Indigenous rights and sovereignty, and 
are thus the foundation cases courts look to for guidance in their deliberations. For 
example, R v Sparrow, the SCC’s first major s 35 decision, addresses the “purposive” 
meaning of s 35 and affirms that “ultimate sovereignty rests with the Crown”.253 R v Van 
der Peet articulates a two part ‘distinctive culture’ test for establishing Indigenous rights. 
Notably, the Van der Peet distinctive culture test, written by Lamer CJC, produced strong 
dissents by McLachlin J and L’Heureux-Dubé J.254 Other important sovereignty cases, 
include R v Pamajewon (the right to operated gambling casinos), Mitchell v MNR (the 
right to duty-free importation of personal use and commercial goods) and most recently 
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (the validity of Indigenous title and the rights 
attached thereto).  
4.5 Delgamuukw v British Columbia 
Delgamuukw v British Columbia255, was the first post-1982 case to consider the question 
of Indigenous title, establish a definitive test for proving title, and address the use of oral 
and traditional evidence in court proceedings. Hence, although built on the Indigenous 
rights precepts established in Sparrow and Van der Peet, and considered St Catherines 
                                                 
252 Grace Li Xiu Woo, Ghost Dancing with Colonialism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) at 107. 
253 R v Sparrow, [1990] SJC No 49 at para 49, “...there was from the outset never any doubt that 
sovereignty and legislative power and indeed, the underlying title to such lands vested in the Crown.” 
254 R v Van der Peet supra note 30 at para 44. 
255 Delgamuukw supra note 33. 
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Milling & Lumber Co v R, Calder v British Columbia, Baker Lake v Canada, Guerin v R, 
and Sioui v Quebec it is arguably the leading SCC case in terms of sovereignty-related 
issues. It has been cited 789 times and judicially referenced 465 times at the time of this 
writing.256  
4.5.1 Background 
Unlike most of Canada, British Columbia has only negotiated a few formal treaties with 
its First Nations inhabitants.257 In 1987, the hereditary chiefs of the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en sued the Canadian and British Columbia governments for recognition of 
their absolute ownership and legal jurisdiction over approximately 58,000 square 
kilometres of territory historically occupied by 71 clan Houses representing 4000 to 5000 
individuals. At the British Columbia Supreme Court, McEachern CJ heard 374 days of 
evidence and argument including testimony from genealogists, linguistic experts, 
archeologists, anthropologists, and geographers. The plaintiffs, representing the Gitksan 
and Wet’suwet’en peoples, sued for ownership of the territory and jurisdiction over it – 
essentially a claim for Aboriginal title. The province of British Columbia counterclaimed 
for a declaration that the plaintiffs’ had no right or interest in the territory or in the 
alternative, should be seeking compensation from the Government of Canada.258 
4.5.2 Trial Court 
At trial, the claimants built their case on customary laws, arguing that traditions such as 
ceremonial feasting and the exchange of gifts were coherent representations of the 
political traditions and sovereign authority that were central to the Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en political and legal orders.259 Many of their representations were offered 
                                                 
256 Source: NextCanada-Westlaw. Online: < https://nextcanada.westlaw.com >. 
257 The British Columbia exceptions include the Vancouver Island Douglas Treaties, a northeastern area 
included in Alberta’s Treaty 8, the 2000 Nisga’a Treaty and the landmark 2014 Tsilhqot’in settlement. 
258 Delgamuukw supra note 33 at paras 5 & 7. 
259 Christopher Roth, supra note 153 at 146. 
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orally and in songs that in their culture memorialize the laws and protocols that govern 
their societies.260 The Gitksan Houses described the histories of their ancestors and 
territories through an ‘adaawk’ – a collection of sacred oral traditions. For their part, the 
Wet’suwet’en Houses offered a ‘kungax’ – a spiritual song or dance that ties them to the 
land.261 Perhaps most importantly, the appellants explained how ceremonial feasting has 
been used by generations of Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en people as a forum for telling 
stories that reinforce laws, their sacred relationship to the land, and describe the territorial 
boundaries.262 From the appellants’ perspective, these demonstrations of long occupation 
and governance of the territory through the adaawk, kungax and feasting traditions 
satisfied the requirements for Aboriginal title protected by s 35(1) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982 – the caveat being acceptance of their oral representations by the court. 
In 1991, after more than three years of investigation and deliberation, McEachern CJ 
ruled against the claimants, dismissing their claims for ownership and jurisdiction of the 
disputed territory, and subjecting their use of vacant lands to the “general law of the 
Province”263 Moreover, he dismissed the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en legal system as a 
“most uncertain and highly flexible set of customs which are frequently not followed by 
the Indians themselves.”264 His ruling effectively “denied the existence of an Indigenous 
                                                 
260 Delgamuukw supra note 33 at para 89. “61 witnesses gave evidence at the trial many using translators... 
[known as] “word spellers’...there were 318 days of testimony and over 50,000 pages of exhibits... [leading 
to] a judgment of over 400 pages in length”. 
261 Supra, Borrows, Indigenous Constitutions note 13. “[t]he Adaawk records property rights such as 
fishing sites, hunting territories, and gathering grounds” at 97. Also “[t]he Kungax tell of the land’s 
creation. The people’s earliest history, territorial boundaries, major battles, and significant past events” at 
92. 
262 Ibid. “[t]he feast has formed their law...the feast structure has built-in procedures to seal and validate 
rights and obligations” at 95. 
263 Delgamuukw, supra at para 30. 
264 Ibid at para 20. 
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legal and political system – even the existence of a ‘civilization’ before the arrival of the 
Europeans”265  
With respect to the claimants’ self-government rights, Justice McEachern ruled that all 
legislative jurisdiction was divided between Canada and the Province in accordance with 
s 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act 1867, leaving no opportunity for Indigenous 
jurisdiction or sovereignty.266  
To further reinforce the Crown’s authority, McEachern CJ ruled “aboriginal rights are not 
proprietary in nature, but rather “personal and usufructuary” and dependent on the 
goodwill of the Sovereign”.267 Accordingly, although he didn’t dispute evidence that the 
claimants’ ancestors occupied communal villages adjacent to their fishing and hunting 
sites in the disputed territories, he was not satisfied that they ‘owned’ the territory “in any 
sense that would be recognized by law”268 The significance of this aspect of the ruling is 
its explicit endorsement of British Imperial law as the only legitimate authority on which 
he could reach judgment. From the perspective of sovereignty, McEachern CJ denies the 
existence of a viable Indigenous claim to sovereignty over the disputed territory on the 
grounds that their conception, based on longstanding exclusive occupation validated by 
traditional laws and customs lacked merit in the context of common law and the 
overriding right of European settles and explorers to assert sovereignty in accordance 
with their formal doctrines and traditions. 
4.5.3 Court of Appeal 
In large measure, the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, written by Macfarlane 
JA and Taggart JA, concurred with the trial judge’s rulings with the exception of those 
                                                 
265 Ibid at para 22.  
266 Ibid at para 20. 
267 Ibid at para 17. 
268 Ibid. Restatement of the McEachern CJ analysis by the Lamer CJC. 
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concerning the extinguishment of Indigenous rights. In that regard, Macfarlane JA ruled 
that McEachern CJ mischaracterized colonial instruments by referring to them as “the 
clear and plain intention to extinguish all aboriginal interests in land”.269 To the contrary, 
Macfarlane JA declared “negotiation” was the most effective way to resolve any such 
issues.270  
Macfarlane JA agreed with McEachern CJ that the appellants’ use of the term 
“ownership” conflicted with Guerin271 that specifically held that “aboriginal interest does 
not amount to beneficial ownership”.272 Critically, Macfarlane JA held that s 88 of the 
Indian Act did not give the Province authority to extinguish common law aboriginal 
rights...[although] it may authorize provincial regulation of and interference with 
aboriginal rights”.273  
The appeal court’s decision was not unanimous. Lambert JA, disagreed with Macfarlane 
JA on the question of Indigenous title and rights, characterizing them as “sui generis, and 
not easily explicable in terms of ordinary western jurisprudential analysis or common law 
concepts”274 Lambert JA reviewed all the key points made at trial and generally showed 
greater deference than his appeal court colleagues or the trial judge to the Indigenous 
perspective. He ruled that McEachern CJ erred in his treatment of occupation and 
                                                 
269Ibid at 36. “The purpose of the colonial instruments in question was to facilitate an orderly settlement of 
the province...[not] that the aboriginal interest was to be disregarded.” 
270 See also para 35 “Treaty-making is the most desirable was to resolve aboriginal land issues”. It is 
apparent that Macfarlane JA was reluctant to overturn the trial judge’s rulings. However, he appeared to be 
putting the province ‘on notice’ that negotiation and treaty-making were preferable to arbitrary acts 
concerning the rights of First Nations. 
271 Ibid at para 32. Macfarlane JA references Guerin v R [1984] SCJ No 45. 
272 Ibid. “Use of the term “ownership” (by the plaintiffs in their pleadings) was unfortunate”. 
273 Ibid at para 37. “If the effect of provincial regulation were to strip the aboriginal people of the use and 
occupation of their traditional homelands, it would be an impermissible intrusion into federal jurisdiction”. 
274 Ibid at para 48. “Aboriginal rights are neither abrogated by the fact that similar rights may be held by 
non-aboriginal people nor because the holders of the rights participate in the wage and cash economy”. 
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possession, in his analysis of Indigenous commercial and trading practices, on the 
question of exclusivity, and the role of the wage and cash economy in terms of 
Indigenous title.275  
On the issue of jurisdiction over the disputed territory, Lambert JA confirmed McEachern 
CJ’s ruling that although the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en people had the right of internal 
self-regulation, the court lacked the authority to grant them jurisdiction over the land, 
resources, and peoples within a territory where legislative powers were granted to a 
province under the Constitution Act, 1867. Hence, he ruled, that the aboriginal people of 
British Columbia were subject to Canadian and Provincial legislative authority, i.e. the 
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en people had no jurisdiction, except internal band regulation, 
and therefore no sovereignty over their traditional lands.276 
Both Lambert JA and Hutcheon JA would have allowed the appeal. Moreover, Lambert 
JA and Hutcheon JA would have awarded the appellants their costs throughout the 
proceedings. 
4.5.4 Supreme Court of Canada 
In 1998, the Court sat as a seven Justice panel to consider the submissions and judgments 
in Delgamuukw, a case that had been in the system for 11 years. In its judgment, the 
Court articulated several legal principles that guide litigants in Aboriginal rights and title 
cases today.  
First, it established the importance and potential reliability of oral evidence despite the 
difficulties it posed when compared to conventional evidentiary practices and rules. Oral 
                                                 
275 Ibid at para 57. 
276 Ibid at para 34. 
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evidence in Indigenous cases must now be treated on an equal footing to traditional 
documentary evidence.277  
In agreement with Lambert JA, the Court ruled that “aboriginal title is the right to the 
land itself [and] aboriginal title includes the right to determine the use to which a piece of 
land may be put, including the right to manage the land’s mineral rights and usage.278 An 
important caveat on determination of land usage was that the nature of the land as it was 
traditionally enjoyed by the community must be respected and preserved for the use and 
enjoyment of future generations, i.e. a community cannot decide to use the land for strip 
mining or clear cut forestry unless they first surrender those lands to the Crown and 
convert them to non-title lands.279 Thus, although expressing the desire to maintain land 
in its traditional form for future generations, the Court ruled that the continuity of the 
relationship between an aboriginal community and its land, and the non-economic value 
of the land should not prevent the community from exchanging the land for consideration 
such as a cash payment or acceptance of another land allotment, to the Crown.280 
Third, the Court established the definitive criteria a First Nation must prove when making 
a title claim: (1) the land must have been occupied prior to declaration of European 
sovereignty, which in British Columbia occurred in 1846; (2) there must be demonstrable 
proof of pre-sovereignty occupation and continuity to the present day; and (3) at the 
declaration of sovereignty, the occupation must be exclusive.281  
                                                 
277 Ibid at para 87. “The laws of evidence must be adapted in order that this type of evidence can be 
accommodated”. 
278 Ibid at para 138 re: the right to land, and para 166 re: the right to determine land’s use. 
279 Ibid at paras 131 & 132. “The foregoing amounts to a general limitation on the use of lands held by 
virtue of aboriginal title”. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid at para 143. Exclusive occupation does not preclude allowing others to use the land for hunting or 
fishing with the permission of the controlling community. The test’s emphasis is on effective control rather 
than total exclusion of neighbouring communities. 
87 
 
Finally, with respect to a province’s right to extinguish Indigenous rights prior to 
enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, the Court held that the federal government had 
exclusive jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal rights from Confederation until 1982 
based on s 91(24) of the British North America Act; and further, that the provinces do not 
have the jurisdiction to enact any laws in relation to Indigenous rights, including laws 
that may affect Indigenous title. British Columbia argued that under s 109 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 “the Crown in right of the province has the underlying title to 
lands held by Aboriginal title...which by implication grants it the right to extinguish 
Aboriginal title”.282 Lamer CJC rejected the Province’s argument stating “although on 
extinguishment of aboriginal title the province would take complete title to the land, the 
jurisdiction to extinguish lies with the federal government”.283 This finding was a major 
blow to the Province’s longstanding assumption that it could extinguish Aboriginal title 
at its discretion without consent or compensation to Indigenous communities. 
In his conclusion, Lamer CJC stated his reluctance to interfere in the findings of the trial 
judge, particularly because many of the appellant’s objections were characterized as 
disagreements with decisions rather than disagreements on facts. He did, however, cite 
the judge for making a serious errors relating to the acceptance of expert testimony and 
his treatment of oral history. In light of the evidentiary errors made by the trial judge, the 
Court ruled that the trial’s “factual findings cannot stand”, and ordered a new trial.284 
4.6 Discussion 
Delgamuukw moved Indigenous rights forward in terms of giving clear judicial guidance 
in areas that had been contentious and adjudicated inconsistently in previous cases. 
However, responses to the Court’s judgment were mixed. Gitksan chief negotiator Mas 
                                                 
282 Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice: Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: 
University of Saskatchewan, 2001) at 259. 
283 Ibid. McNeil quotes Lamer CJC from Delgamuukw at 260. 
284 Delgamuukw supra note 33 at para 108. 
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Gak stated “This is the judgment the Gitksan people have worked towards...[for] over 
130 years ... “We are extremely happy.”285 A less enthusiastic response was offered by 
Federal Opposition Leader Preston Manning, an Albertan, who called the decision “a 
breathtaking mistake” while observing that the Court had overstepped its authority by 
making laws – a privilege that rightfully belongs to Parliament...not unelected Judges.286 
Other observers, on both sides of the issue, offered equally candid comments. 
For example, Christopher Roth, an Indigenous activist, claims Delgamuukw reset the 
legal clock to the moment of European contact and “the implications of the decision are 
so monumental that many [observers]...have not yet fully comprehended how far 
reaching the new legal dispensation is for aboriginal people”.287 In the main, Roth argues 
that Indigenous title has never been extinguished and thus, their sovereignty over the 
lands and peoples of the disputed territories is beyond question.288 From that foundation, 
he postulates “what we know as British Columbia has not been ceded to the Crown and is 
thus not part of Canada.”289  
He concludes that Delgamuukw does not attribute aboriginal title per se to any 
contemporary group [but] provides guidelines for proving aboriginal title...all of which 
were abundantly met in the course of the plaintiffs’ evidence at trial.290 Implicitly, British 
Columbia’s Indigenous peoples have legitimate title and sovereignty over all land in the 
province not specifically ceded by treaty. Roth’s interpretation of Delgamuukw is 
arguably more sanguine than rational despite the enthusiasm with which he presents it, 
                                                 
285 Quoted by Borrows in “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v British Columbia” 
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 537 at 543. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Christopher Roth, supra note 153 at 143. 
288 Supra note 151.  
289 Ibid at 150. 
290 Ibid. 
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particularly in light of Lambert JA’s ruling that the sovereignty claimed in Delgamuukw 
was limited to jurisdiction over internal matters – not the land itself.291 
Grace Woo characterizes Delgamuukw as a continuing expression of colonialism 
declaring “Lamer resorted to a personal standard. Instead of grounding his analysis in a 
legality created with the consent of the people concerned, he sought to impose his own 
ill-defined beliefs, giving his reasoning a colonial tinge”292 Her analysis mirrors that of 
Edward Hedican who, as previously reported, claims “Lamer... had absolutely no idea [as 
to] what is culture”.293  
Woo is concerned that the Crown and courts rely on colonial laws to the exclusion of 
those of the Indigenous people being judged in what she refers to as “a morality that 
plainly violates both modern standards and those of the early contact era”.294 Implicitly, 
Woo characterizes the courts as agents of the Crown’s conception of sovereignty based 
on historic doctrines and self-justifying precedents at the expense of Indigenous laws, 
customs and traditions, as evidenced in Delgamuukw where at trial McEachern CJ 
dismissed evidence of Indigenous traditional governance and legal orders, and on appeal, 
Lambert reinforced the doctrine of Crown sovereignty over all but internal band 
administrative matters.  
In a more reflective vein, John Borrows argues that although Delgamuukw changed the 
law to protect Aboriginal title, it simultaneously undermined their rights through 
promulgation of colonial assertions of Crown sovereignty that infringe upon all 
Indigenous rights. In this regard, he concurs with Grace Woo that colonial precepts are 
afforded priority over Indigenous traditions and Aboriginal rights. 
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Borrows’ Delgamuukw analysis is arguably the most comprehensive article written on 
the case to date.295 Two aspects of his analysis are particularly relevant to this research. 
The first concerns the method of establishing Indigenous title. Borrows has two principal 
concerns in this area: (1) basing title on the date of the Crown’s “non-consensual” 
assertion of sovereignty (1846 in British Columbia) reinforces the Province’s “colonial 
heritage”296; and (2) the requirement to prove occupation of the land prior to the 
sovereignty assertion, and that occupation was continuous and exclusive. At issue here is 
the requirement that Indigenous groups should have to ‘prove’ anything. Borrows argues 
that not requiring the Crown to offer similar proofs represents a double standard that is 
“deeply discriminatory and unjust”.297 On this point, Borrows receives strong support 
from Manitoba Court Associate Chief Justice Alvin Hamilton who, taking exception to 
the Supreme Court, writes:  
Aboriginal people should not have to prove the extent of their territory, their trading 
practices and lifestyle. The onus should be upon subsequently established governments to 
show that those attributes do not extend to the lands claimed by them and to prove any 
limitation they can on the extent of Aboriginal sovereignty.298  
It is difficult to dispute Borrows’ and Hamilton’s concerns when the Court rules that 
Canada’s original inhabitants must prove their rights while the Crown attains theirs 
through a simple assertion. 
Borrows’ second criticism concerns the Court’s acceptance of oral and traditional 
evidence in pleadings. He argues that although the ruling facilitates the representation of 
Indigenous perspectives, the Court’s procedural rules diminish the role of Indigenous 
                                                 
295 John Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v British Columbia” (1999) 37 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 537. 
296 Ibid at 544. 
297 Ibid at 573. 
298 Hon. Alvin Hamilton, A Feather Not a Gavel: Working towards Aboriginal Justice (2001) at 81. 
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legal traditions, making the Court and implicitly its “Western” conception of sovereignty 
“the final arbiter in the interpretation of facts”.299 Here, Borrows observes that 
Indigenous beliefs and history are embodied in language, stories, and songs that create 
meaning and shape the structures upon which the Indigenous culture is based. Sharing 
these narratives diminishes their “power ... [in terms of] self-definition and self-
determination”.300  
Moreover, Borrows postulates that the ruling, although well-intentioned, risks 
“perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by Aboriginal peoples at the hands of the 
colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of pre-existing Aboriginal 
societies.”301 One might argue that Borrows’ evidentiary assertions ‘paint him into a 
corner’ in the sense that he argues that Indigenous litigants have the right and need to 
present evidence according to their customs and traditions, while simultaneously arguing 
that doing so violates the privacy and uniqueness of their culture. In Canada’s Indigenous 
Constitution he supports increasing accessibility to Indigenous law to both “Indigenous 
peoples and the broader Canadian Society”302 but states “not all laws should be 
written...where writing Indigenous law would deprive it of its force”.303 From that, one 
might conclude that he is prepared to document the ‘ordinary’ laws that govern 
Indigenous society, but reserves the right to keep secret the ‘important’ laws that 
underpin Indigenous social norms based on spiritual or traditional tenets. 
Borrows concludes his analysis with the assertion that uneven application of the law, in 
the sense that Indigenous litigants are held to higher standards than the Crown, negatively 
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impacts the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state and was 
neither resolved nor advanced in Delgamuukw. 
4.7 Summary 
Delgamuukw gave the Court an opportunity to articulate a number of principles and put 
to rest several questions that had troubled cases such as Calder, Sparrow, Van de Peet, 
and others. Its judgment directly affects sovereignty issues, particularly as they relate to 
land title and the relative responsibilities of the Crown and Indigenous societies regarding 
jurisdiction. Importantly, Delgamuukw legitimized the value of Indigenous oral evidence, 
although the relative weight given to oral and common law evidence at trial remains an 
open question. 
The decision to place oral history on an equal footing with traditional documentary 
evidence was a victory for Indigenous litigants who had often been disadvantaged in 
court proceedings. However, McLachlin CJC qualified the utility of oral evidence in 
Mitchell when she ruled “Aboriginal oral histories may meet the test of usefulness... if no 
other means of obtaining the same evidence may exist...[and] the witness [is] a reliable 
source of the particular people’s history”.304 Moreover, as observed by Borrows, 
acceptance of oral history may be a moot victory if Indigenous leaders and elders are 
reluctant to reveal their histories and legal traditions in court proceedings they perceive as 
manifestations of colonialism that are biased and disrespectful of Indigenous customs. 
Equally important was the holding that Indigenous interest in land is ‘general’ and 
includes an economic dimension that encompasses sub-surface mineral rights and 
forestry management, albeit with restrictions on non-traditional land use, i.e. its 
protection for future generations. With respect to infringements by provincial or federal 
authorities wishing to use Indigenous land for their purposes, the Court affirmed that 
Indigenous communities must be consulted, accommodated, and compensated for the 
development of their resources. Importantly, the honour of the Crown doctrine obligates 
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it to negotiate infringements in good faith, and may give Indigenous communities the 
right to withhold their consent.  
In the context of sovereignty, neither Indigenous nor settler perspectives received 
outstanding support from Delgamuukw. The Court endorsed England’s sovereignty in the 
context of the Royal Proclamation which it ruled applied across Canada – not solely in 
the original colonial possessions. The historic significance of Indigenous traditions and 
sovereignty claims was acknowledged, but the Court’s judgment, although affirming their 
rights, did not grant the title and self-government rights they sought. In the final analysis, 
in terms of improving the Crown-Indigenous relationship or definitively resolving 
sovereignty-based disputes, Delgamuukw may be best considered a draw -- a neutral 
contributor that at the end of the day failed to fully satisfy any of the parties involved. 
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Chapter 5  
5 Conclusion 
Sovereignty, like democracy, law, and reconciliation, is a term that conjures different 
meanings depending on the context in which it is used and the socio-economic-
ideological orientation of the user. This research has documented four interpretations: (1) 
the traditional Indigenous conception of sovereignty as an inherent personal right – a gift 
from the Creator that can neither be given, taken away, nor negotiated; (2) the traditional 
western interpretation based on the Westphalian tenet of supreme territorial sovereignty; 
(3) an evolving Indigenous conception that perceives sovereignty as an analogue for self-
government and self-determination; and (4) an evolving Westphalian interpretation in 
which international cooperation is transforming territorial supremacy into a shared 
sovereignty paradigm in response to the challenges of globalization and supranational 
governmental entities. 
Prior to the 16th century, Canada’s inhabitants lived relatively peaceful, relatively 
comfortable lives in regions stretching from the Pacific to Atlantic coasts, with scattered 
family-based groups in the far north. Over thousands of years, each group established 
political, legal, and social orders that matched their territorial circumstances. The 
Iroquoian and Pacific coast nations developed sophisticated systems within and among 
their substantial, permanent communities. Others, particularly the Inuit, subsisted in 
environments more akin to those of hunter-gatherers who were more concerned with 
survival than political structure.305 
The differences among First Nations is a recurring theme throughout this research. It is a 
reality that cannot be disputed, but has historically been misunderstood by politicians, 
courts, and Crown agencies, resulting in policies based on the deeply flawed ‘one size fits 
all’ mindset held since first contact. The Indian Act is an example of the homogeneity 
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assumption used as the foundation for legislation that is arguably the cornerstone of the 
Crown’s expression of sovereignty over Indigenous peoples. A reasonable argument can 
be made that the historic failures to improve Crown-Indigenous relations outlined in this 
paper are at least in part a consequence of misunderstanding the diversity and uniqueness 
of indigeneity writ large. 
The Court has identified ‘reconciliation’ as a principal objective of s 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.306 Successive Parliaments have pledged to reconcile the 
relationship on a priority basis, albeit with limited success. Although one should remain 
optimistic, it is difficult to anticipate ‘reconciliation’ as the most likely outcome of 
relationship improvement efforts by Indigenous peoples, the Crown and courts, due to 
fundamental differences in their conceptions of sovereignty, justice, and reconciliation 
itself. In that regard, Nuri Frame, a Toronto-based lawyer who specializes in cases 
involving Indigenous interests, asserts that reconciliation is challenged by a significant 
gap between Crown and Indigenous understandings of the term. 
The Crown appears to conceive of reconciliation as something to be achieved once and 
for all time [whereas] peoples, in contrast, conceive of reconciliation as something to be 
strived for continuously [and] signing a modern treaty means entering into a relationship 
of reconciliation – one that is generative, dynamic, and necessarily partial.307 
Borrows agrees that treaties are perceived by First Nations as compacts that must be 
renewed on an occasional basis and adjusted to reflect current circumstances.308 Thomas 
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Isaac endorses the continuous engagement paradigm, describing reconciliation as a 
process “the objective of which is to reach a mutual, respectful understanding among 
peoples.”309  
One can immediately see that Indigenous conceptions of reconciliation are consistent 
with their understandings of treaties and accords writ large, i.e. they are symbols of 
relationships that must be affirmed and renewed on an ongoing basis. They are not, as 
Frame observes, ‘transactions’ that can be concluded and considered final for all time. It 
therefore seems apparent that before reconciliation can be achieved, the Crown must 
replace its transactional negotiating strategy with a relationship-based paradigm that is 
respectful of Indigenous customs and beliefs.  
At this point is reasonable to ask how, in an environment burdened by conceptual 
contradictions, can reconciliation – itself a disputed term - be achieved? A potential 
answer may be found in the Indigenous self-government project, i.e. establishing a third 
order of government within the Canadian constitutional framework.  
The challenge, of course, is how to implement Indigenous self-government. Can it be 
done with a ‘stroke of a pen’ or does it require a constitutional amendment? Moreover, 
does self-government imply full independence in the nature of early Westphalian treaties, 
or is it a variant of the sovereignty association concept promoted by separatists in the 
1980 Quebec independence referendum?  
This research has identified a number of issues associated with sovereignty, self-
determination, and reconciliation that are inextricably linked and possibly insoluble at a 
philosophical level. There are, in truth, many complex issues to resolve along the path to 
reconciliation, some of which may elude the sincere good faith efforts of all parties. It is 
possible that in the fullness of time, the Federal government’s efforts may lead to a more 
trusting and respectful atmosphere which some might characterize as reconciliation. In 
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the meantime, I believe that the following areas should be considered for additional 
research in the coming years: 
The Homogeneity Challenge. Canada’s First Nations exhibit great diversity in customs, 
governance, economics, and future prospects. There is a pressing opportunity to address 
the diversity challenges to better align public policy with the circumstances of the large, 
politically and economically sophisticated First Nations that are capable of self-funding 
and governance; and small, isolated nations that will unlikely ever become economically 
viable or capable of self-government. Developing a comprehensive understanding of the 
issue and specific recommendations to address it is an area that would benefit from 
additional scholarly research. 
Constitutional and Legal Pluralism. The development of distinctive Indigenous 
constitutions has been addressed by John Borrows and others, but there is an opportunity 
for additional research regarding the interaction between emerging Indigenous 
constitutions and Canada’s present constitution acts. Moreover, there is an opportunity 
for research leading to avoidance of the potential s 52 primacy contradiction, i.e. the 
assertions that each e.g. the Constitution Act, 1982 and future Indigenous constitutions 
has primacy. There is also an opportunity to extend the current research on the creation of 
third government and legal orders, leading to fully empowered Indigenous polities within 
Canada’s federalist paradigm. 
An important aspect of the ‘third order’ concept concerns creation of formal institutions 
for resolving legal disputes in accordance with Indigenous legal traditions. The proposed 
institutions could operate in parallel to the court systems currently in provinces and 
territories. The Indigenous institutions could have the same status and authority as 
existing Provincial superior or appellate Courts. The issue of first and final venues of 
appeal will require additional study, as will the challenge of populating the ‘courts’ with 
qualified Indigenous adjudicators. 
At its outset, this paper postulated that sovereignty lies at the heart of Indigenous 
aspirations to regain the dignity, identity, and rights lost to the effects of colonialism and 
oppression. I have considered sovereignty from philosophical and practical perspectives, 
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and demonstrated how the Crown and courts have sometimes worked against each other, 
thus diminishing the opportunity for achieving a mutually acceptable interpretation of 
sovereignty – one that will satisfy the respective needs of the Crown and Indigenous 
nations. Finally, I have two potential research topics that may lead to improved public 
policy development and a more effective legal order within the current federal paradigm. 
Contemporary Crown-Indigenous relationship problems cannot be solved without efforts 
on all sides to move past deeply entrenched distrust and historic failures. The Crown 
must change its perception of First Nations from being ‘wards of the state’ under the 
control of federal agencies, to being fully empowered confederal partners, equal in every 
sense to the provinces and territories. That said, the many small, isolated and 
economically challenged First Nations must continue to receive governance and financial 
support, possibly through an Indigenous-funded equalization system such as that 
established for the provinces in s 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982. There may also be 
opportunities to bring small nations together into large, aggregated entities in the same 
manner as Ontario consolidated many of its small municipalities into regional entities to 
increase efficiency and expand the range of services available to the smallest 
communities. 
There will be serious challenges to the concept of creating a third order of government in 
Canada: some will be irrational assertions from nationalists who refuse to accept First 
Nations as equals; some will relate to the size, sophistication and economic 
circumstances of some First Nations; and others based on fear of losing identity through 
consolidation or amalgamation of small First Nations. One can also anticipate resistance 
from Indigenous leaders and activists who reject the notion that their inherent rights were 
ever ceded to British sovereignty, and will resist any initiatives that perpetuate or deepen 
that relationship either through the Indian Act, modern treaties, or self-government 
agreements. To that point, as previously discussed, fully independent First Nations would 
face innumerable self-sufficiency issues, particularly those arising from their lack of 
international recognition. 
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I believe the greatest challenge to moving forward is not overcoming philosophical, 
economic, legal, or structural problems: It is mustering the political will to do so. 
Canadian governments from Sir John A. Macdonald to Justin Trudeau have continually 
pledged to reconcile the Crown-Indigenous relationship, although in retrospect, 
Macdonald was primarily interested in assimilation, whereas Trudeau speaks and has 
directed his ministry to focus on renewal based on self-governance, respect for historic 
treaties, and resetting the relationship.  
Much has been written and said about sovereignty and reconciliation of Crown-
Indigenous relationship from the moment of Confederation. Many programs, 
commissions, and enquiries have been empowered to study the issue. Little has been 
achieved. I respectfully submit it is time for all sides to stop political grandstanding and 
embark on the real work required to achieve results. 
++++++++++ 
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